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I ask whether added liquidity factors improve the ability of the Sharp-Lintner CAPM and the Fama 
French three-factor model to explain asset returns, ex-post, in the Norwegian stock market. Through 
cross-sectional and time-series regression tests, on both the original and the liquidity-augmented 
versions of the equity risk premium models, I search for a reversed liquidity premium in the period 
2006-2011. I find that the liquidity factors, represented by the bid-ask spread and turnover, 
marginally improve the empirical ability of the models to explain asset prices and conclude that there 
is empirical support for a multidimensional liquidity premium. The implications of my results 
contradict flight-to-liquidity theory and suggest that different dimensions of liquidity are rewarded a 
premium in different stages of the business-cycle - offering liquidity based rationale for the size and 
value-effect.  
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“…asset pricing ignores the central fact that asset prices evolve in markets. Markets provide liquidity 
and price discovery, and I argue that asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to 
incorporate the transactions costs of liquidity and the risks of price discovery” 
Maureen O’Hara. Presidential address to the American Financial Association, 2003 
I ask whether the ability of the Sharp-Lintner CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model to 
explain asset returns, ex-post, is improved by accounting for a liquidity risk premium. The motivation 
behind this research is to make a contribution to the overall understanding of the equity risk 
premium.  
The equity risk premium (ERP) has a large impact on portfolio allocation decisions, investments 
strategies and estimating the cost of capital (Mehra, 2008). Because the equity risk premium is the 
only connection between the abstract concept of risk and the concrete concept of capital return, it 
also has a large impact on valuation. This makes it a decisive factor in terms of how wealth is 
allocated across different asset classes and which securities we invest in (Damodaran, 2010).  It plays 
a central role in how funds are managed and which projects managers choose to accept. A wrong 
estimation of the ERP could lead to pension funds allocating the wrong amount of capital in equity. It 
could also lead to managers accepting high risk projects that never should be done, or denying good 
projects that would have created value. It is not difficult to see that a better understanding of the 
ERP has importance that reach far beyond its academic relevance.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) is arguably 
the most common way of estimating the ERP1. However, despite its simplicity and clever rationale, it 
has never performed as well empirically as hoped (Basu, 1977; Reinganum, 1980; Fama & MacBeth, 
1973). The adjustment for firm size and price-to-book ratio, suggested by Fama and French, 
improved empirical results, but with a limited theoretical rationale (Fama & French, 1992; 2004). Size 
and value of firms are, at best, proxies for state variables – variables reflecting changes in 
consumption (Merton, 1973).  
A common weakness of both equity risk premium models is that none of them necessarily account 
for the costs and risks related to owning illiquid assets. Gibson and Mougeot (2004, p.1) write: 
“Typically, continuous-time arbitrage or equilibrium asset pricing models ignore liquidity since the 
cost and time required to transfer financial wealth into cash is assumed to be nil…” The CAPM, as 
described by Sharp and Lintner, assume that the investor only holds a one-period portfolio - 
effectively removing the issue of liquidity in trading. The Fama French three-factor model does not 
account for trading directly. However, it does not rule out that size and value proxy for state 
variables and liquidity.  
                                                          
1 A survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) show that 74% of 392 US CFOs reliy on the CAPM when 
estimating he cost of equity. 
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There is support for a liquidity premium in both theoretical and empirical research. In theory, traders 
of illiquid asses will face higher opportunity costs (Grossman & Miller, 1987), higher risks of 
bankruptcy in recessions – due to lower funding abilities (Lustig & Chien, 2001; Liu, 2006), and 
information risk – as consequence of asymmetric information (O'Hara, 2003). There are also 
theoretical and empirical grounds for a premium to compensate a flight-to-liquidity in recessions 
(Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; Amihud, Mendelson, & Wood, 1990; Amihud, 2002). Empirical evidence 
supports the theoretical claims of a liquidity premium (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Datar, Naik, & 
Radcliffe, 1998; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chan & Haff, 2005), but struggle to connect cause 
and effect – due to the multidimensional liquidity risks.  
Unlike other anomalies2, the presence of a liquidity risk premium does not necessarily imply market 
inefficiency. Amihud writes: “We emphasize that the spread effect [referring to the bid-ask spread 
effects due to illiquidity] is by no means an anomaly or an indication of market inefficiency; rather, it 
represents a rational response by an efficient market to the existence of the spread.” (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986, p. 224). If investors deserve a liquidity premium in addition to their risk premium, 
as a rational response to the existence of illiquidity, the CAPM may be unable to account for 
differences in assets liquidity. This may also be the case for the Fama French three-factor model, but 
the possibility of a correlation between liquidity and size (Amihud, 2002) – explaining the empirical 
performance of the three-factor mode, must be considered as well. My purpose is to decide whether 
a liquidity premium might be a missing piece of the puzzle – improving the empirical performance of 
the CAPM and providing theoretical support for the Fama French three-factor model.  
Based on this rationale, I test the following hypotheses: 
H1: The ability of the CAPM to explain expected returns, ex post, is improved by the addition of 
liquidity factors. 
H2: The ability of the Fama French three-factor model to explain expected returns, ex post, is not 
improved by the addition of liquidity factors. 
I test the hypotheses through OLS cross-sectional and time-series regressions on both liquidity 
augmented and original versions of the CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model. The models 
ability to explain returns are appreciated on basis of the size and significance of alphas, their 
adjusted R2 and the significance of priced factors. However, since there is a risk that my liquidity-
proxies not necessarily reflect liquidity; I also look for a rationale which is consistent with 
consumption-based asset pricing theory (Cochrane, 2001) before a final conclusion can be drawn. My 
methodical approach has three original contributions: 
1. Instead of looking for positive premiums, in the form of average excess returns over a long 
period (Sharp, 1964; Amihud & Mendelson, 1986), I look at data from 2006-2011 in search of 
a negative premium in recessions – supporting a positive premium for the same factor when 
consumption is high. 
                                                          
2
 Like the momentum effect (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) and several calendar effects (Rozeff & Kinney, 1976; 
Keim, Brown, Kleidon, & Marsh, 1983; Ariel, A montly effect in stock returns, 1987) 
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2. Due to the multidimensional nature of liquidity, I use both the bid-ask spread, turnover and 
combinations of the two as proxy for liquidity in my regressions tests. 
3. I look at the Norwegian stock market because it is less liquid than traditional U.S. data - 
amplifying any illiquidity-effects. This choice also reduces the probability of data snooping.  
I will not quantify the size of the liquidity premium, because I expect to find a negative premium in 
the period and don’t believe it is representative of the average excess return on illiquid assets. 
I find that the bid-ask spread and turnover appear to be priced factors in both models, but only 
improved their ability to price assets marginally. My results contradict the flight-to-liquidity theory 
(Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; Amihud, Mendelson, & Wood, 1990) and suggest that different 
dimensions of liquidity are rewarded a premium in different stages of the business-cycle – providing 
a liquidity-based rationale for the size and value-effect (Fama & French, 1992). 
In the next chapter I introduce the main rationale behind the CAPM and the three-factor model as 
special cases of the consumption based model (Cochrane, 2001). I will discuss their main weaknesses 
and rationalize the need for improvements before introducing both theoretical and empirical 
evidence in support of a liquidity risk premium. I will further describe the methodical framework for 
testing the equity risk pricing models and the choice of data. Finally I will present the results of the 
empirical tests, discuss them and conclude with what implications the results have for the greater 
understanding of the equity risk premium.  
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In this chapter I rationalize the need for empirical research on the effects of trading liquidity on the 
equity risk premium. 
This section introduces the consumption-based model – of which both the CAPM and the Fama 
French three-factor model are special cases. This generic model provides a theoretical platform of 
which the liquidity augmented versions of the two equity risk premium models can be built. I also 
offer a review of the theoretical and empirical challenges of the CAPM and the Fama French model. 
The consumption-based asset pricing model tries to understand the value of claims to uncertain 
payments (Cochrane, 2001). Although these uncertain payments have proven difficult to price, the 
consumption-based model is based on a basic equality: The marginal utility of consuming a little less 
today, in order to buy more of an asset, must be equal to the marginal utility gain of consuming the 
profits of that asset at a later point3. Whether investors should be expected to act this rationally and 
informed is debatable, but this is beyond the scope of this paper4.  Based on the assumption above, 
asset prices can be calculated the following way:  
                       (1)       
Pi is the price of asset i, xi is the expected cash flow from asset i and m is a factor that adjusts the 
cash flow according to what the marginal utility of cash is at the given time. Different equity risk 
premium models handle the m, also known as the stochastic discount factor, in different ways. The 
common denominator should be that it reflects the marginal investor’s current utility of the cash 
flow.   
What about the cash flow, xi? It would be natural to expect asset prices to vary mostly with variations 
in cash flow expectations. This may however not be as important as first assumed. In his 2011 
presidential address to the American Finance Association, John Cochrane claimed that: “All price-
dividend ratio volatility corresponds to variation in expected returns. None corresponds to variation in 
expected dividend growth, and none to ‘rational bubbles.’” (Cochrane, 2011, p 5). Although this is a 
strong statement, it can be argued that changes in expected cash flow are diversifiable – leaving 
pricing to changes in the discount factor alone.  
The discount factor, m, representing the cost of capital, will not be diversifiable. Whether it is 
constant or varies with time, is however highly debatable (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). The 
                                                          
3
 How to describe utility as a function of consumption is clearly debatable, but the standard assumption is that 
the function is concave – meaning that each additional dollar is valued, but a little less each time. 
4
 My opinion is that the assumption of efficient markets is not rooted in the belief that markets always act 
efficiently, but that they are more efficient than inefficient and should be modeled thereafter. The market 
appears inefficient enough for there to be an industry trying to benefit from informed decisions, but this does 
not necessarily mean that the efficient market hypothesis is not a good model for the market in general. More 
on the discussion on market efficiency is summarized by Dimson (Dimson & Mussavian, 1998) 
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standard approach of assessing the discount factor was to look at historical averages (Sharp, 1964) – 
assuming it to be the best indicator of future expected returns5. Although the total average will be 
indicative of the expected discount factor6, historical averages must be observed and learned from 
on the basis of their respective macro-regime as well7.  
Accepting the premise of Cochrane (2011), asset pricing is a function of changes in the discount rate, 
m, also called the expected rate of return or the equity risk premium (ERP). All equity risk premium 
models are based on different ways of assessing m. I will limit my scope to the factor pricing models, 
where the discount factor is a linear function of a set of proxies, 
           
      
                             (2) 
In this equation, f represent different risk factors and a and b are the factor loadings – the assets 
exposure to the given factor. Each factor should be a plausible proxy for changes in marginal utility, 
leaving researchers with the question of what causes changes in marginal utility. Finding proxies for 
changes in the marginal utility is however one of the more debated subjects in financial theory. 
Although the equity risk premium (ERP) is easily defined as; the expected return of common stock, 
minus the return of a risk-free investment in the same period (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011), it’s 
forward-looking nature makes it surprisingly difficult to measure. Nobel prizewinner Merton Miller 
(2000) writes: 
“I still remember the teasing we financial economists, Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe, and I, had to 
put up with from the physicists and chemists in Stockholm when we conceded that the basic unit of 
our research, the expected rate of return, was not actually observable. I tried to tease back by 
reminding them of their neutrino—a particle with no mass whose presence was inferred only as a 
missing residual from the interactions of other particles. But that was eight years ago. In the 
meantime, the neutrino has been detected.” (Miller, 2000, p 13) 
Cochrane ( 2001, p 149) suggests that factors to be considered should have certain characteristics: 
“…the essence of asset pricing is that there are specific states of the world in which investors are 
especially concerned that their portfolios not do badly. <…> The factors are variables that indicate 
that these “bad states” have occurred.” The rationale is that assets exposed to factors that cause 
them to underperform when marginal utility is low should be less attractive among traders. This 
causes a reduction in prices for all assets exposed to the factor. Because a reduction in price is 
independent of the asset’s dividends, the asset will provide higher excess returns and thus a higher 
risk premium than similar stock, without exposure to the factors.  
Research and intuition both agree that consumption is high when marginal utility is low (Cochrane, 
2001). Factor models thus look for factors correlating with changes in consumption. There are 
several signs in support of a strong correlation between the volatility of macroeconomic factors like 
inflation, interest rates and expected GDP growth, and the ERP – confirming that such changes in 
                                                          
5
 Alternatives to historical methods are implied methods and surveys (Koller, Goedhart, & Williams, 2002; 
Graham & Harvey, 2008). These methods are not as influential and beyond the scope of this paper.  
6
 Dimson et al. measures the ERP from 1900 – 2008 to 7.1% and other results vary from 3% - 8.5%. (Brealey, 
Myers, & Allen, 2011) 
7
 The historical average discount factor would i.e. change significantly measured before and after 2008. 
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consumption might be the right place to look for factors (Lettau, Ludvigson, & Wachter, 2008; Brandt 
& Wang, 2002)8 9. 
Based on this insight in the rationale behind the consumption-based model, I will now introduce the 
most common equity premium models, their assumptions and their empirical significance.  
The CAPM claims that the only factor in equation 2 is the excess return on the mean-variance 
efficient market portfolio, less the risk-free rate (Markowitz, 1959; Tobin, 1958). Assets are priced 
only depending on their covariance with this market portfolio. In order to arrive at this conclusion, 
Markowitz made the following assumptions10: 
 All investors are risk averse 
 All investors use a portfolio that optimizes mean-variance  
 All investors think only about this one-period investment 
 All investors are rational 
 All investors have the same information 
 All trades are made without tax and transaction costs 
These assumptions , in addition to Tobin’s assumption of risk-free borrowing and lending finalized 
the capital asset pricing model, which states that each asset, i, has an expected excess return (E(ri) – 
rf) given by the following equation 
                                  (3)   
Where rf is the risk free rate, E(rm) is the expected return on the market portfolio and β is the 
covariance between return on the asset and the market portfolio E(rm) – rf  and E(ri) – rf  can be 
described respectively as the excess return on the market (ERPm) and the excess return on the asset i 
(ERPi),  leaving us with the CAPM on its factor from: 
                          (4) 
Based on the factor- model in equation 2, it appears that the excess market return is a proxy for 
changes in marginal utility – consistent with the philosophy of the consumption-based model. It 
seems intuitive that high beta assets should provide higher returns. Due to their large co-variance 
with the market, their price will be low in recessions, when money is needed and high in bull 
markets, when money is in excess. From a marginal utility point of view, these assets are less 
                                                          
8
 However, growth of GDP or employment rate might come as a consequence of the stock market volatility and 
not vice versa. The accumulated value of all public stocks at OSEBX increased from 5% of the total BNP in 1980 
to 90% in 2006 (Næs, Skjeltorp, & Ødegaard, 2007). An interesting example of this would be a probable change 
in macroeconomic volatility after the financial crisis in 2008, and not before. 
9
 A collective change in risk aversion also changes the ERP (Damodaran, 2010). Most authors assume investors 
to be risk averse (Sharp, 1964; Pastor & Stambaugh, 2001), others risk neutral, (Miller E. , 197). 
10
 Note that these are special assumptions of the CAPM, and not of the consumption-based model. 
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attractive and investors should receive a premium from owning them. Another question is however 
whether the market portfolio fully reflects the change in consumption and marginal utility11. 
Critique of the CAPM 
The CAPM has been widely criticized for its assumptions. The market is naturally not completely 
efficient (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985), some investors will be risk seeking and irrational (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994) and there will be limitations for how much investors can lend or borrow 
(Fama & French, 2004). In addition, the CAPM is unclear about what the risk free-rate should be12. 
Despite the critique, it is important to realize that the object of the model is to simplify the world 
around us enough so that we can understand it. The question is therefore not whether the 
assumptions are always correct, but whether the model benefits from the assumptions.  
The main problem of the CAPM is that it has been somewhat empirically disappointing. The first 
cross-sectional test, indicated there was a positive relation between average return and beta, but 
that it was too flat compared to what the CAPM predicted (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972; Blume & 
Friend, 1973). The intercept was also found to be consistently larger than the risk free rate. Time-
series regression tests showed the same effect and that the intercepts of high beta portfolios were 
negative, while the intercepts on low beta portfolios were positive. The less-restrictive Black-version 
of the CAPM (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972), demanding only a positive slope by allowing 
unrestricted short selling of risky assets, managed restored some faith in the CAPM, but the claim 
that no other variables than the market beta should be able to explain excess returns, became 
difficult to defend empirically (Basu, 1977; Reinganum, 1980). This was the beginning of the ICAPM, 
Arbitrage pricing theory and the Fama French three-factor model. 
Based on the work of Basu (1977), Banz (1981), Reiganum (1980) and several others, Fama and 
French (1992) made the discovery that once historical data was adjusted for market capitalization 
and price-to-book ratio, the beta had little explanatory ability left. In order to explain the anomalies, 
other than calling them miss-estimations (Fama & French, 1988; Stambaugh, 1982; Roll, 1981)13 or 
abandon the efficient market hypothesis (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994), Fama and French 
adjusted the assumptions of the CAPM. Inspired by the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM) (Merton, 1973), they rejected the assumption that the investors only think about their first 
investment. “For example, the assumption that investors care only about the mean and variance of 
one-period portfolio returns is extreme” (Fama and French, 2004, p. 37). They also abandoned the 
                                                          
11
 This problem is called Roll’s critique (Roll, 1976), and argues that the use of a large index, only reflects 
changes of consumption in equity markets. In order to account for the changes in marginal utility, the market 
portfolio should contain bonds, commodities, real-estate and all other assets reflecting consumption. This 
portfolio would be virtually impossible to create.  
12
 A lot of researchers use a 1 year US T-bill as the risk free rate. Koller et al. (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 
Valuation, 2005)  argue that, from a valuation point of view, is important that one uses the same year of 
maturation on the bonds or bills as once would use to discount the cash-flow. 
13
 There has also been a debate on the subject of arithmetic vs geometric averaging. Some also choose to use a 
weighted average of the two, with the weight of geometric premium increasing with longer time series (Indro 
& Lee, 1997). 
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idea that the market is the only factor that explains return – allowing for market capitalization and 
price-to-book ratios as additional factors in the consumption-based factor model.  
However, size and value of firms don’t appear to be state variables, as neither size nor price-to-book 
ratios are likely to be indicators of changes in consumption or marginal utility. Fama and French 
explain this by appealing to Ross’s arbitrage pricing theory (APT) (Ross, 1976). Arbitrage pricing 
theory uses the same principal as the generalized factor model of the consumption-based model - a 
“price of risk” – the risk premium, multiplied with the “how much of risk” – the beta. However, the 
arbitrage model does not suggest which factor the expected return might vary with and accept that 
the factors could proxy for a state variable not captured by the market beta. This rationale supported 
the Fama French three-factor mode, another special case of equation 2: 
 
                         [        ]                       (5) 
 
Where SMB and VMG are factors representing the excess returns on small cap and value stock 
respectively, and si and hi is the respective “beta” of the two factors representing the exposure of 
asset/portfolio to each factor.  
 
The three-factor model has over time become a benchmark for asset pricing models. Fama and 
French agree that the main shortcoming of the model, from a theoretical perspective, is its empirical 
motivation. It has been argued that small companies run a larger risk of bankruptcy in recessions 
(Amihud, 2002) and that value companies are leveraged and pro-cyclical (Zhang, 2005), thus 
providing a consumption-based rationale for a risk premium. However, the authors themselves argue 
from a statistical point of view: “In support of this claim, they [Fama & French, 1992] show that the 
returns on the stock for small firms covary more with one another than with returns on the stock of 
large firms and returns on high book-to-market (value) stock covary more with one another than with 
returns on low book-to-market (growth) stock.“ (Fama & French, 2004, p 38). Regardless of this 
debate, the CAPM and the three-factor model are the main asset pricing models taught in corporate 
finance classes around the world.  
 
Critique of the three-factor model 
Although the three-factor model may be viewed as an improvement of the CAPM, due to better 
empirical performance, it has weaknesses. Several researchers have found other anomalies which 
are orthogonal to the market and unaffected by the size and value factors provided by Fama and 
French. Some find a momentum effect, implying continuing high returns on previous winners 
(Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997) while others find an opposite effect (De Bondt & Thaler, 
1985). Several seasonal anomalies have been found. Among them, that some months provide better 
returns than others (Rozeff & Kinney, 1976; Keim, Brown, Kleidon, & Marsh, 1983), some weeks of 
the month give higher returns (Ariel, 1987), some days of the week give higher returns (French, 
1980), and finally that some hours of the day provide higher returns (Harris, 1986).  
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In addition to the landslide of anomalies, the spread between small cap and large cap has been 
reduced since its discovery in 1980 (Amihud, 2002). This could imply that the rewarded premium for 
size, or what size is a proxy for, varies with time14. Research also finds that over fifty percent of the 
premium is found in the month of January (Keim D. , 1982). Both of these observations leave room 
for a debate on whether size is a proxy for a state variable. Are the factors found by Fama and French 
unique, or coincidently the once found first?  The price-to-book ratio as a factor is also criticized. 
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan argue that this factor will be biased by the fact that low price-to-book 
assets will historically have a lower tendency to go bankrupt – also known as survivorship bias 
(Kothari, Shanken, & Sloan, 1995). Even Eugene Fama, states in his 1991 article that the APT in 
combination with the ICAPM has provided researchers with a license to search for data that, ex-post, 
describe the cross section of average returns. Based on this statement, I find it important to search 
for properly rationalized factors in the further research on equity risk premium models.  
 
  
                                                          
14
 Given that the market is presumed to be efficient. If it is not efficient, this could be a result of the market 
adjusting for its previous neglect. 
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I have observed that the three-factor model appears to be empirically better than the CAPM15, but 
lack a clear theoretical motivation. I propose that including a liquidity premium in the equation will 
result in a better empirical performance of the CAPM or a more intuitive theoretical motivation of 
the three-factor model. In support of improved theoretical motivation, Amihud (2002) find that 
illiquidity strongly affects small firm stocks – implying liquidity could explain the size effect variations 
over time.  
  
This section shows why liquidity should be a priced factor in the consumption-based factor models. I 
review both theoretical and empirical evidence in support of a multidimensional liquidity premium 
and show that a liquidity premium is a rational compensation for increased opportunity cost 
(Grossman & Miller, 1987), risk of flight-to-liquidity (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005) and higher risks of 
bankruptcy in recessions – due to lower funding abilities (Lustig & Chien, 2001; Liu, 2006).  
Before introducing these costs, I define liquidity and consider whether the origin of liquidity itself 
could be the cause of a liquidity premium.  
Liquidity can affect asset prices in several ways. Assets may be affected by how sensitive they are to 
changes in the aggregated market trading liquidity (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2001; Chordia, Roll, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2000)16, to changes in individual trading liquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; 
Grossman & Miller, 1987; Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998; Eleswarapu & Reinganum, 1993; O'Hara, 
2003), how sensitive they are to the company’s financial liquidity (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009) 
and combinations these (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005).  Although a connection between the company’s 
financial liquidity and the trading liquidity has been found, my research will only be concerned with 
trading liquidity. Similarly, my contribution will be on how individual stock returns vary with its 
liquidity and not how it varies with the total liquidity in the market. This is illustrated in figure 1: 
                                                          
15
 In the favor of the CAPM it should be mentioned that the anomalies used in the Fama French model was 
discovered as a consequence of the CAPM. 
16
 Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) found that expected stock returns are significantly higher for stocks with high 
sensitivity to market-wide liquidity than stocks with low sensitivity.  Similar studies have supported the claim of 
a systematic liquidity risk (Gibson & Mougeot, 2004) 
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Figure 1: Different ways liquidity affects asset prices. I will focus on how the trading liquidity of individual assets explains 
asset returns as market in the figure. 
Could the origin of liquidity rationalize a liquidity premium? 
This section looks at the origin of liquidity and whether the origin itself is reason to expect a 
premium.  
The seller and the buyer may agree on the “fundamental value” of an asset, but that does not 
necessarily imply that they find each other in the marketplace (O'Hara, 2003). Differences in liquidity 
stem from factors affecting the probability of these two traders meeting – like timing, accessibility 
and the number of traders. The issue of timing and accessibility has largely been improved by 
internet trading17. It is, however, difficult to explain why some assets appear to be more “popular” in 
an efficient market. The EMH would argue that there must be a rational reason why assets become 
illiquid, not just negligence18.  
O’Hara (2003) provides such a solution, arguing that some traders will, in periods, have better 
information, but that this changes over time: “New information arrives, old information becomes 
stale” (O'Hara, 2003, p 1351). This is not the same as saying that some traders always have arbitrage 
opportunities. The asymmetrical information would imply that no single market portfolio would be 
held. Rather, informed traders would have overweight of stock they believed to provide higher 
returns and underweight in underperforming stocks. The movement away from the market portfolio 
would also imply that the informed trader would bear idiosyncratic risk. The same could be said 
about the uninformed trader, also bearing idiosyncratic risk, believing assets to be mispriced. It is 
important to recognize that these asymmetries are not a sign of market inefficiencies, but rather an 
assumption that the markets can be efficient without everybody having the same information at all 
times.  
                                                          
17
 According to Amihud, as much as 11% of American traders traded primarily online in 1999. These figures 
were expected to quadruple already by 2003 (Amihud, 2000).   
18
 Contrary to the suggestion of Amihud (2000) – stating that companies are “forgotten” by the market and can 
be made more liquid by increasing the flow of information from the company. 
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Despite the first impression, O’Hara’s rationale does not imply that the uninformed investors are less 
intelligent or irrational19. O’Hara argues that the uninformed trader recognize the information risk 
and wants compensation for bearing it through increased returns on illiquid assets. The uninformed 
traders also lower their informational disadvantage by trading familiar assets of which they have 
access to information. Studies have shown that local investors tend to valuate local stocks higher 
(Coval & Moskowitz, 1999). This is because traders tend to buy assets which they have a secure flow 
of news from and previous experience with. Given the fact that 1/3 of the assets at OSEBX are owned 
by foreign investors20, this would suggest that the liquid companies in Norway, are those in familiar 
industries which provide a good flow of information. 
If some stocks are illiquid due to information risk, this alone suggests that a liquidity premium should 
be rewarded. However, the origin of illiquidity could also be related to a more simple argument 
concerning market capitalization. When large funds buy equity, only the largest companies have 
large enough market capitalization to provide sufficient volume, without getting control of the 
company21. Given their size and the fact that transaction cost represents a large portion of their total 
cost, this reduces the number of potential assets such funds can consider. The consequence of this 
would be that assets with large market cap would be more liquid and provide lower returns - 
coinciding with the size-effect. This explanation of the origin of liquidity does not necessarily imply 
that traders of illiquid assets should be rewarded a premium. To make the chaos complete, O’Hara 
(2003) even argues that liquidity might be a zero-sum game – due to transfer of liquidity between 
markets22. 
Due to this uncertainty about the origin of illiquidity, it is difficult to know whether traders of illiquid 
assets already deserve a premium due to information risk. However, in the next section, I will also 
consider whether liquidity cost exists, independently of its origin.  
Liquidity costs 
Regardless of the origin of differences in liquidity, it has costs that should be accounted for. The 
literature on the subject of a liquidity premium is vast and non-trivial. Research on microstructure 
theory point to a potential premium connected to liquidity caused by increased transaction cost, 
from trading illiquid assets (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Pastor & Stambaugh, 2001). These are cost 
related to price impact of block sales and appear unrelated to changes in marginal utility23. There is 
also a growing literature branch, arguing that liquidity affects the risk of holding an illiquid asset 
because they will underperform in recessions – liquidity risk (Lustig & Chien, 2001; Holmstrom & 
Triole, 2001; Liu, 2006). This branch argues that there might be a non-diversifiable risk of holding 
illiquid assets that is more market dependant. It appears there are two costs of different nature 
related to liquidity. I find support for this through Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam stating (2000, p. 
6)”… there are potentially two different channels by which trading costs influence asset pricing, one 
                                                          
19
 According to behavioral finance, there would be suspicions that the traders could be overconfident or 
affected by their beliefs when interpreting information (Shleifer & Summers, 1990). 
20
 www.oslobors.no 
21
 The Norwegian state pension fund has strict rules about not making any strategic impact on any company. 
22
 I argue that even if it can be assumed the aggregated flow of liquidity to be constant, it will be the 
percentage change in trading volume that must be accounted for.  
23 
Although they appear relatively independent, it is easily arguable that they will covary with the market. 
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static and one dynamic: a static channel influencing average trading costs and a dynamic channel 
influencing risk”24. 
In order to discuss the implications of this theory I will separate between increased transaction costs 
- caused by illiquid assets, and liquidity risk – caused by the cost of being illiquid in recessions25. The 
overall costs connected to liquidity are summarized in figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical costs related to illiquid assets. The left side consists of cost related to risks of holding illiquid assets 
in recessions. The right side consists of cost related to the increased transaction costs of illiquid assets, which are present 
also outside recessions. 
In the following section I will explain the rationale behind the complete figure and provide 
theoretical support for a multidimensional liquidity risk premium. I will explain how all costs related 
to illiquid assets can be found in the risk of funding, risk of flight-to-liquidity and of an increased 
opportunity costs – as well as how the last two can be expressed as a market maker cost. 
Increased transaction costs – consequences of market impact in imperfect markets  
The increased transaction costs of illiquid assets are most easily understood through microstructure 
theory. Kyle identified three main characteristics of market liquidity; tightness, depth and resilience 
(Kyle, 1985). In the diagram in figure 3, first portrayed by Kerry in 200826, these three characteristics 
are portrayed. 
                                                          
24 
Although Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, refer to the commonality in liquidity in this quote, addressing 
individual stocks sensitivity to movements in aggregated market liquidity, they make a point in the direction 
that assets might have illiquidity risk in addition to its, static, transaction cost. 
25
 The distinction between transaction costs as a function of illiquidity and liquidity risk is indicated by O’Hara 
(O'Hara, 2003). 
26
Found in article by Hibbert et al. (2009) 
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Figure 3: Dimensions of market liquidly; Depth, Tightness and Resilience.   
Depth is the volume of trades possible without affecting the given price. Tightness refers to size of 
the bid-ask spread. Resilience is the speed with which prices recover from a random, uninformative 
shock. Due to their lower depth and higher spread and resilience, illiquid assets have higher 
transaction costs than their liquid counterparts. These costs are bid-ask spread costs – the cost of 
buying at a spread, rather than the current value, and the market impact cost – related to 
unnecessary movement of the price in block sales, due to low depth and high resilience (Keim & 
Madhavan, 1996)27. These increased costs are present, to some degree, independent of the changes 
in consumption – thus, not reflected in market beta. In equilibrium, these costs should be accounted 
for by a premium to motivate traders to buy illiquid assets, despite their increased costs.  
However, Amihud argues that the increased transaction costs28 are not necessarily unavoidable and 
can be reduced in two ways29 – through increased brokerage costs and opportunity costs, as shown 
in figure 2. The first approach is to choose a market with higher commissions and fees. This will lead 
to higher brokerage costs, but trading there might results in lower market impact costs. Although 
such trading solutions marginally reduce transaction costs, this will be close to a zero-sum game, as 
brokers will receive most of the margin. Opportunity cost is as an alternative cost to market impact 
cost. Instead making a large impact on the assets price, an investor looking to do a block sale could 
stay patient and sell small parts of the asset at the time to traders willing to pay “full price”. The cost 
is then related to the risk of price changes during the search for such traders, missing opportunities 
in other assets, or worse – the market discovers that a block sale is taking place and adjusts.  
It could be argued that these costs are diversifiable. It appears there are upsides to holding illiquid 
assets as well, although not necessarily equal in size. An investor holding an illiquid stock could be 
                                                          
27
 Larger block trades that have a large impact on the market could reflect information asymmetry (Easley, et 
al., 2002; O'Hara, 2003). 
28
 Amihud calls these cost adverse selection costs because he argues that the bid-ask spread and the impact 
cost are related to information asymmetries, where uninformed traders must pay the increased transaction 
cost (Amihud, 2000). 
29
 Although Amihud only describe the different ways of handling the increased transaction cost, I assume that 
the alternative ways of avoiding market impact cost reduces the total costs. If they did not, the alternatives 
would not have any reason to exist – according to standard transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937).  
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offered a premium when the stock suddenly becomes attractive. The impact cost, referred to by 
Amihud, might be reversed in a scenario where traders wish to buy the asset. However, there is a 
difference between the need of buying an asset and the need for selling one (Chordia, Roll, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2000). If investors are to be modeled as rational, they would not buy an asset at any 
cost, there are however examples of solvency constraints forcing traders to sell at fire-sale prices 
(Lustig & Chien, 2001). This asymmetry cause increased opportunity costs, due to illiquidity, to be 
only partly diversifiable.  
So far, the increased transaction costs appear to be different ways of accepting the static cost 
created by illiquid assets. These costs may vary slightly with changes in consumption and marginal 
utility, but are also founded in real monetary cost of the trader, unrelated to market beta.  As I will 
explain in the following section, illiquid assets also have a cost dimension that is more related to the 
business-cycle.  
Liquidity risk – consequences of exposure to illiquid assets in recessions 
In the other end of figure 2 from the static transaction costs, I find theory pointing towards a liquidity 
risk related to changes in consumption and marginal utility. These are costs that are not diversifiable, 
and should ideally be explained by market beta. Lui argues that illiquid assets will have a hard time 
getting company funding when consumption is low (Liu, 2006). This theory coincides with theory 
stating that solvency constraints give rise to a liquidity risk (Lustig & Chien, 2001). This dimension of 
liquidity risk also has clear similarities to the risk of owning small companies in recessions (Amihud, 
2002).  
In addition to the risk of bankruptcy of illiquid companies, research also suggests a flight-to-liquidity 
when consumption is low and marginal utility is high (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005). This theory is 
based on the rationale that illiquid assets will underperform in recessions because this is a time when 
traders might need their savings to cover other costs30. In periods of low consumption, market 
illiquidity rises causing a decline in stock prices and a rise in expected returns. Due to the flight-to-
liquidity, liquid stocks should decline less than illiquid stocks in these periods (Amihud, 2002). 
Amihud base this on findings from the market crash of October 1987, where liquid assets 
outperformed illiquid assets (Amihud, Mendelson, & Wood, 1990). Ideally, this dynamic part of the 
illiquidity cost should be accounted for by market beta of Sharp and Lintner – which could also be 
said about arguments used to validate the size and value factors as proxies for state variables (Fama 
& French, 1992). This completes figure 2.  However, although it appears that there are four separate 
costs related to liquidity, they can in practice be viewed as two, given rational investors.  
Up to now, I have assumed that all traders are equally suited to hold illiquid assets – accepting the 
opportunity cost as unavoidable. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), have another view on this. If I 
accept the assumption that markets should not be modeled as frictionless, making liquidity an issue 
investors must incorporate in their rationale, it is possible to argue that different investors’ time-
                                                          
30
 Chordia states the following about the liquidity crisis in 1998: “This event precipitated financial distress in 
certain highly leveraged trading firms which found themselves unable to liquidate some positions to pay 
lenders secured by other, seemingly unrelated positions” (Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2000) 
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frames may play an important role. Some investors might have a financial strength that allows them 
to invest with different demands to when realization of the assets must take place. 
Assuming this is true, an alternative way of assessing the risk of being illiquid in a flight-to-liquidity 
scenario is the existence of market makers, known as the clientele effect. Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986, p. 225) write: “The market makers bridge the time gaps between the arrivals of buyers and 
sellers to the market, absorb transitory excess demand or supply in the inventory positions, and are 
compensated by the spread.” If we accept that investors make decisions based on their investment 
horizon, Amihud and Mendelsons point seems intuitive. Grossmann and Miller (1987) explain market 
liquidity as a function of the demand for immediacy, where market makers supply immediacy to 
investors with limited investment horizons – an effect that should intuitively correlate with the 
business-cycle. A large need for immediacy will raise the premium of illiquid assets in order to 
provide incentives for market makers to provide the service of waiting for what Grossman describes 
as “the ultimate buyer”31. Gibson and Mougeot (2004) and Lustig and Chien (2001) all claim that the 
supply of market makers, is market dependent factors, changing with marginal utility.  
As illustrated in figure 4, opportunity cost – as an alternative to market impact cost is of the same 
nature as the fire-sales costs in a flight-to-liquidity. They are a function of the number of market 
makers and the need for immediacy. A difference is however that the flight-to-liquidity risk is 
primarily a cost related to recessions, while the opportunity cost is a not necessarily related to 
recessions.32.  
Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) make an interesting point in light of the market maker framework. One 
should distinguish carefully between assets and value. They argue that assets do not have value until 
they are placed in a portfolio and the intentions of the investor are articulated in terms of a “liquidity 
policy”. If all investors are rational, they would not risk increased opportunity cost and brokerage 
costs or a flight-to-liquidity, if another trader is in a better position to bear the same risk – minimizing 
the cost. If my assumptions are correct, the consequences of my rationale is that a possible liquidity 
premium only varies with changes in funding risk and changes in market maker costs.  
                                                          
31
 The ultimate buyer is the buyer that is willing to pay the price that includes the premium. 
32
 The opportunity cost is naturally also considerably higher in recessions, but present at some level 
independent of macro-economy. 
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Figure 4: Theoretical costs related to illiquid assets - provided investors act rationally. If investors only trade assets with 
liquidity that match their financial strength, opportunity costs and flight-to-liquidity risk will be optimized because they 
are held by market makers. These costs should therefore be observed as market maker costs. The probability of 
bankruptcy due to limited funding opportunities for illiquid assets is also present and unaffected by the market makers 
ability to hold assets. 
This finalizes my theoretical evidence in support of a liquidity premium. As shown in figure 4, the 
increased costs of illiquid assets can ideally be thought of as two theoretical costs:  
 A liquidity risk related to funding of illiquid assets in recessions.  
 The combined opportunity cost and risk of flight-to-liquidity risk faced by the market maker. 
Depending on whether illiquidity has its origin in inefficient markets, information asymmetries or a 
market cap restrictions, there may also exist a cost related to information risk.  
Before empirically evaluating whether my two liquidity costs are priced in equity markets, I will look 
at previous empirical findings on the nature of the liquidity premium. 
Several empirical results from the U.S. stock market support a liquidity premium. Although it is nearly 
impossible to isolate a single factors ability to affect stock prices, an interesting experiment 
performed by Amihud and Lauterbach looked at changes in stock returns, when moved from an 
illiquid market to a liquid market (Amihud, 2000). They found that the change in liquidity 
corresponded to a premium of 5.5%33. This does not necessarily imply that all changes in trading 
liquidity are exogenous34, but is one of the few results of tests where a large liquidity change has 
been observed “independently” of other factors.   
                                                          
33
 The gradual movement from a market, where trades were done once a day, to a continuous market, 
improved liquidity significantly. Compared to similar experiments, connected to IPOs, these stocks were moved 
in “random” groups from one market to another, not reflecting any company specific news one might find in an 
IPO. One can however not rule out that the sample was affected by market effects in the given period. 
34
 The same authors find evidence that i.e. improved flow of information from the company, increases liquidity. 
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In more regular regression tests of asset pricing models, both Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) observe annual expected return as an increasing and concave 
function of the bid-ask spread. Similar tests from the U.S. market apply the stock turnover rate as a 
proxy for its liquidity (Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998). They found that turnover rate is significantly 
negatively related to stock returns - a result supporting the work of Amihud and Mendelson. Based 
on this research, Datar, Naik and Radcliffe suggest an annually liquidity premium around 4.5%. They 
did, however, not speculate about the possibility of a multidimensional premium nor find any results 
indicating that the size or value factors affect the significance of the turnover or bid-ask spread35.  
Other researchers have developed their own models in order to find empirical evidence of the 
liquidity premium; Keim and Madhaven (1996) find that the impact cost alone is in the area of 1.86 – 
3.28%. These are pure transaction costs related to block sales. Archarya and Pedersen  (2005) 
developed a liquidity augmented CAPM, adjusted for both market wide liquidity and asset liquidity. 
They found empirical evidence pointing towards an annual liquidity risk premium of 3.5% which they 
explain as a response to a strong positive correlation between illiquidity costs and market return – 
supporting the flight-to-liquidity theory. This is similar to the explanation Amihud, Mendelson and 
Wood, (1990) has for the excess returns on liquid assets in the October crash, 1987. 
The contributions from less liquid markets are perhaps even more relevant for the study of the 
effects of trading liquidity on asset returns. Chan and Haff (2005) find support for their turnover 
augmented Fama French three-factor model based on the Australian stock market between 1990 
and 1998. Similarly, Norwegian data show that a bid-ask spread augmented three-factor model 
improves the understanding of asset pricing in the Norwegian market (Næs, Skjeltorp, & Ødegaard, 
2007).  
A summary of the empirical results is found in table 1. It is important to recognize that most of these 
premiums, rationalized by the consumption-based model, are found by looking for average excess 
returns in historical data. This only tells half the story. Although positive average excess return over 
time suggests a premium, several of the authors conclude that the premium is paid due to 
underperformance when consumption is low – the flight-to-liquidity (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; 
Amihud, 2002; Lustig & Chien, 2001). Although this is an intuitive suggestion, a premium found when 
marginal utility is low does not necessarily imply a negative premium when marginal utility is high. I 
will look further into this issue in my research. 
  
                                                          
35
 Datar, Naik and Radcliffe used data similar to the data Fama and French used in their important 1992 article. 
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Table 1: Summary of empirical evidence of a liquidity premium 
Literature Market 
Time 
period 
Proxy Method 
LP-
estimate 
Remarks 
Amihud and 
Mendelson 
(1986) 
NYSE 1961-1980 
Bid-ask 
spread 
OLS 4.5% 
Cross-
sectional 
Eleswarapu 
and Reinganum 
(1993)  
NYSE 1955-1979 
Bid-ask 
spread 
OLS - 
Cross-
sectional 
Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam 
(1996) 
NYSE 1984-1991 
Bid-ask 
spread 
GLS - 
Time-series 
and cross-
sectional 
Keim and 
Madhavan 
(1996) 
NYSE, 
AMEX and 
NASDAQ 
1985-1992 Trade size 
Regression 
on own 
model 
1.86-
3.28%36 
Covers only 
impact cost 
Datar, Naik and 
Radcliffe (1998) 
NYSE 1962-1991 Turnover GLS 4.5% 
Cross-
sectional 
Acharya and 
Pedersen 
(2005) 
NYSE 1962-1999 
Cost of 
selling37 
Regression 
on own 
model 
3.5%38 
Liquidity 
adjusted 
CAPM 
Chan and Faff 
(2005) 
ASX 
(Australia) 
1989-1998 Turnover GMM - Time-series 
Næs, Skjeltorp 
and Ødegaard 
(2007) 
OSEBX 1980-2005 
Bid-ask 
spread 
GMM - Time-series 
  
                                                          
36
 The article only reports research on the cost of impact through block sales. 
37
 This is the ILLIQ measure used by Amihud (2002), incorporating how much the stock moves due to a small 
change in volume.  
38
 Low liquidity stocks have 4.6% higher expected returns than high liquidity stocks. 3.5% is due to differences 
in expected liquidity, 1.1% is due to the liquidity risk premium 
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Based on the discussion above, some expectation can be formulated about the impact of liquidity 
factors on the equity risk pricing models. I expect the augmented CAPM to perform better empirically 
and that liquidity factors can improve the theoretical motivation of the Fama French model. 
However, due to expected correlation between size and certain dimensions of liquidity, I do not 
expect improved empirical results for the augmented three-factor model. I do however believe that 
the size effect will be significantly reduced once it has been adjusted for a liquidity factor. 
In order to quantify my expectations, I formulate the following hypotheses:  
H1: The ability of the CAPM to explain expected returns, ex post, is improved by the addition of 
liquidity factors.  
H2: The ability of the Fama French three-factor model to explain expected returns, ex post, is not 
improved by the addition of liquidity factors. 
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I have established that the standard asset pricing models are to a certain degree empirically 
unsatisfying and that both theory and empirical data support a liquidity premium for equity. The next 
step is to see whether the asset pricing models could be improved by the addition of liquidity factors. 
This chapter first discusses the choice of proxy for liquidity, before rationalizing the method and data 
chosen to test whether liquidity factors improve asset pricing models.  
In order to test my hypotheses, the choice of liquidity proxy should ideally reflect the two central 
liquidity costs found in the theory – funding risk and the market makers costs of increased 
opportunity costs and flight-to-liquidity risk39.  
The original measurements the bid-ask spread, intuitively reflects the price impact and is used in 
several central publications (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Eleswarapu & Reinganum, 1993). It is 
calculated as  
     
          
 
 
            
      (6) 
where PAsk is the asking price of the stock at close and PBid is the bidding price at close in the last day 
of each month. The rationale behind this liquidity proxy is that an increase in the number of traders 
will lead to a lower spread due to the increasing number of asking and bidding prices – improving the 
resolution.   
The bid-ask spread has been criticized for being a noisy measure of illiquidity because block trades 
will happen outside the spread and small trades might happen within the spread (Lee, Mucklow, & 
Ready, 1993). Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) also suggest that there is a large difference between 
the posted spread and the effective spread in terms of what will be the actual transaction cost. Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready and Petersen and Fialkowski, are however mostly concerned with the actual 
reflected cost of the bid-ask spread, while I only ask whether the proxy indicates a particular 
dimension of liquidity.  
Due to the critique of the bid-ask spread, Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998) use turnover as their proxy 
for liquidity. Turnover is the total trading volume of an asset in a period divided by the amount of the 
asset in circulation in that period and is more related to trading frequency. It has been criticized for 
mainly indicating price disagreement – thus to a larger degree reflecting firm specific uncertainty 
(Karpoff, 1987; Blume, Easley, & O'Hara, 1994). Despite these arguments, turnover also addresses 
the interest in the asset and its ability to attract funding – making it a good measure for a potential 
risk premium. 
                                                          
39
 Amihud - one of the leading researchers on the relationship between liquidity and asset prices states that it is 
doubtful that there is one single measure that captures all its aspects (Amihud, 2002). Different proxies appear 
to account for the different dimensions of liquidity. 
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The bid-ask spread and turnover are only two of many possible liquidity proxies40. However, each of 
them captures the two dimensions of liquidity found in the previous chapter: 
 The bid-ask spread is intuitively related to the increased transaction cost because it accounts 
for the increase in spread the trader have to pay for an illiquid asset. Based on the rationale 
of Amihud (2000), the increased transaction cost can, and should, be handled as opportunity 
cost – costs that are minimized in the hands of the proper market maker. Thus, it appears 
that the spread could be an indicator of the premium rewarded to the market makers 
exposed to opportunity costs or the risk of flight-to-liquidity.  
 The turnover is also a good measure of the liquidity of an asset, but may be a better indicator 
of the number of traders interested in the asset, than the bid-ask spread. Based on this 
rationale, turnover would be a good measure of the premium rewarded to unattractive 
assets over attractive assets – a subject related to how easily a company can obtain funding 
though i.e. equity offerings in recessions.  
I do not expect the two factors to be independent of each other. I.e. turnover will probably be a good 
indicator of how easy it is to sell an asset in a flight-to-liquidity scenario. I do however believe they 
are able to price assets differently on the basis of their exposure to the different kinds of liquidity 
risks. I therefore use both the bid-ask spread, turnover and combinations of the two as proxies for 
liquidity in my regression tests. 
In order to evaluate whether a liquidity factor would improve traditional asset pricing models, I 
perform both cross-sectional and time-series OLS regression tests41 on both the two original and six 
liquidity-augmented versions of the CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model. The cross 
sectional tests are run across all assets in four different time periods and the five different time-
series test are performed on portfolios sorted on their beta, market capitalization (size), price-to-
book-ratio (value), bid-ask spread and turnover. A summary of these tests is shown in table 2 and 3.  
  
  
                                                          
40  There are several others to be considered, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. Here are some: 
Unique roundtrip cost, return-to-volume measure (ILLIQ - the so called Amihud measure (Amihud, 2002)), 
number of zero-day trades, volatility in liquidity, trading speed (Liu, 2006) and several others (Hibbert, Kirchner, 
Kretzshmar, Li, & McNeil, 2009).  
41
 I use the ordinary least square (OLS) regression in this paper. Methods like GLS and GMM are improvements 
of this model, but since I will not draw any binary conclusions in this paper, I believe the OLS to be sufficient. 
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Table 2: Summary of cross-sectional tests. Eight models in four periods, across all assets. 
Models Periods Assets 
CAPM 
CAPM + bid-ask spread factor 
CAPM + turnover factor 
CAPM + bid-ask spread factor and turnover factor 
 
Three-factor model 
Three-factor model + bid-ask spread factor 
Three-factor model + turnover factor 
Three-factor model + bid-ask spread factor and  
turnover factor  
Pre crisis   
2006 – 2008 
All assets 
Crisis  
2008 – mid 2009 
Post crisis 
mid 2009 – 2011 
Entire period 
2006 – 2011 
 
Table 3: Summary of time-series tests. Eight models in one period, on 25 portfolios. 
Models Periods  Assets 
CAPM 
CAPM + bid-ask spread factor 
CAPM + turnover factor 
CAPM + bid-ask spread factor and turnover factor 
 
Three-factor model 
Three-factor model + bid-ask spread factor 
Three-factor model + turnover factor 
Three-factor model + bid-ask spread factor and  
turnover factor  
 
 
 
 
Entire period  
2006 – 2011 
 
5 beta portfolios 
5 size portfolios 
5 value 
portfolios 
5 bid-ask spread 
portfolios 
5 turnover 
portfolios 
 
In theory, the model that works best has intercepts equal to zero in all regressions and the cross-
sectional test has a slope equal to the excess market return in the period. This approach is widely 
recognized as the standard method of testing asset pricing models42. I evaluate the factors ability to 
improve the model on the basis of the significance of the intercepts, the R2, and the significance of 
                                                          
42
 (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972; Fama & French, 1992; Fama & MacBeth, 1973; Chan & Haff, 2005; Pastor & 
Stambaugh, 2001; Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998; Gibson & Mougeot, 2004; Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 
2000) 
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the factors. In order to validate my results further, I also demand that they have an intuitive rationale 
– founded in financial theory.  
An important assumption of such historical regressions is that ex-post returns equals ex-ante returns, 
meaning that the historical realized returns are the expected returns. I also assume that the betas of 
the respective factors are constant in the entire estimation period43. In order to perform the OLS 
test, I also need to assume that the returns are drawn from a normally, identical and independent 
distribution (n.i.i.d). The weakest of the assumptions is probably that the distribution is identical in 
each draw, given that my regression is done on an intertemporal model. This problem will however 
be reduced by the limited timeframe, giving reason to believe that all data belongs within the same 
macro-regime. On the other hand, the financial crisis in 2008 probably changed the distribution. 
The OLS time-series tests are done to observe how different portfolios were explained by the models 
over time. This test is based on the methodical work of Fama and French (Fama & French, 1993), 
originally developed by Jensen, Black and Scholes (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972). Monthly excess 
returns on a variety of portfolios are regressed against the right hand variables of the CAPM and the 
Fama French three-factor model. The two models are evaluated both with and without additional 
liquidity factors in order to observe changes caused by the additional independent variable. Five 
orthogonal proxy factors are constructed: ERP – representing the excess market return (Rm) over the 
risk-free rate (rf), SMB – representing the excess return on small companies over large companies, 
VMG – representing the excess return on low price-to-book companies over high price-to-book 
companies, WMN – representing the excess return on companies with wide bid-ask spread over 
companies with narrow bid-ask spread and HML – representing the excess return on companies with 
low turnover over companies with high turnover. Time-series regressions are performed on the 
following equations: 
CAPM: 
                                (7) 
CAPM w/Bid-ask spread: 
                                        (8) 
CAPM w/turnover: 
                                         (9) 
CAPM w/Bid-ask spread and turnover: 
                                                (10) 
                                                          
43
 Not only is this debatable, as companies change over periods – changing their exposure to the factor, but it 
also causes a large debate on how they should be estimated. 
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Fama French three-three factor model: 
                                                (11) 
Fama French three-three factor model w/Bid-ask spread: 
                                                       (12) 
Fama French three-three factor model w/turnover: 
                                                       (13) 
Fama French three-three factor model w/Bid-ask spread and turnover: 
                                                              (14) 
Where E(rit) is the expected return on asset or portfolio i, rf is the risk free rate, αit is the intercept, βi 
is the market beta, si is the size-beta,  vi is the value-beta, wi is the bid-ask spread-beta, and hi is the 
turnover-beta 
The results of each regression are five betas representing the factor loadings to each of the factors, 
ERP, SMB, VMG, WMN and HML. Significance-tests are done on all betas, in the form of p-values. The 
main interest is however the alpha variations for the different models. As stated by Black, Jensen and 
Scholes (1972) the capital asset pricing models must provide zero alphas for all portfolios in order to 
explain the market prices. It is not sufficient to have the average of alphas equal to zero. Because of 
this, it is not sufficient to look at individual p-values to make sure that the alphas are all zero.  
A common way of assuring al the alphas are zero is the GRS-test, developed by Gibbons, Ross and 
Shanken (1989). This test assumes no heteroskedasticity and no autocorrelation as well as n.i.i.d in 
the residuals (Cochrane, 2001). The GRS-test tests the joint significance of the alphas across the 
different portfolios and provides a test statistic J, which tests the null hypothesis that all alphas 
equals zero. 
      
     
 
 (  
   
  
 )
  
            (15) 
T is the number of months, N is the number of asset/portfolios tested, µm and σm  is the average 
excess return and standard deviation on the market portfolio proxy, α is the vector of the Nx1 alphas 
from the regression and ∑ is the T x N matrix with the residuals from the same regression. I further 
calculate p-values for the F-distributed J statistics.  
Factor construction 
In order to properly test different factors’ ability to price assets, I need to secure that the factors are 
orthogonal to each other – meaning that the factors are constructed so that they are not biased by 
changes in other factors (Fama & French, 1992). I.e. if the SME factor is created by subtracting the 
difference between the excess returns on small cap less the excess return on large cap, the method 
makes sure both portfolios have a 50/50 percentage of value and growth stock, so that changes in 
returns are independent of the value factor.  
26 
 
The companies are first divided into two groups based on their respective market capitalization44, 
each group is further divided in two according to their price-to-book ratio, then their bid-ask spread 
and finally their turnover. The portfolios are rebalanced on a yearly basis. From this process, sixteen 
orthogonal portfolios are made – SVWH, SVWL, SVNH, SVNL, SGWH, SGWL, SGNH, SGNL, BVWH, 
BVWL, BVNH, BVNL, BGWH, BGWL, BGNH, BGNL. The factors are then calculated in the following 
fashion: 
    
 
 
                                            
 
 
                                              
 
    
 
 
                                             
 
 
                                             
 
    
 
 
                                            
 
 
                                              
 
    
 
 
                                            
 
 
                                              
 
Portfolio construction 
Both the CAPM and the three-factor models should, in theory, work just as well on portfolios as on 
single assets. If any of the models are unable to account for the returns of portfolios sorted by a 
common factor, this suggests that the model has flaws. Based on this, five portfolios45 are made, for 
                                                          
44
 Although it is somewhat more common to divide each factor into three levels - high, medium and low, I find 
it necessary to divide into two levels - high and low due to a limited dataset. 
45
 Other authors created up to ten portfolios; however, limited sample size could create misleading returns.  
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each of the factors used in the liquidity augmented versions of the CAPM and the three factor model;  
beta, market capitalization, price-to-book ratio, bid-ask spread and turnover46.  
Five, equally weighted beta portfolios are made on the basis of their average 12-month beta and re-
balanced yearly. The individual betas are calculated based on monthly returns on the individual 
assets and the use of OSEBX as market portfolio47. Returns are calculated as a percentage change in 
the value of one NOK invested in that portfolio during month t. 
The five size portfolios are created on the basis of their average market capitalization in the month of 
December the previous year and rebalanced each year. Similarly to the size factor, monthly average 
price-to-book data is used as guidelines for the creation of five value portfolios. The companies with 
low price-to-book ratio are named value stocks, while the companies with high price-to-book ratio 
are named growth stocks. Beta portfolios are adjusted based on their 12-month average beta, while 
the size portfolios and the price-to-book ratios are adjusted according to their respective average 
values in the month of December. This is because an investor would use a data series stretching over 
some months when assessing different company beta because it is a statistical result in need of a 
time-series. When assessing market capitalization and price-to-book ratio, averaged yearly data 
provide poorer information of the stock’s current status and does not reflect recent price changes 
that would be relevant in the investment choice.  
Liquidity portfolios are also constructed on the basis of the companies’ relative bid-ask spread and 
turnover. For each of the two liquidity proxy’s, five portfolios are made. The portfolios are 
rebalanced each year. The issue of the rebalancing is not as straight forward as with the other factors 
because it is not obvious whether a 12 month average or the average of December is more 
representative. The average over the last month of the previous year would of course be a more 
updated measure of the stocks liquidity, but might be biased by whether or not the company 
reported their yearly figures in that month or other company specific factors. I therefore use a 
rebalancing strategy based on the previous 12 months48.  
In addition to a time-series test, I also perform a cross-sectional test on all eight equity risk premium 
models. The object of this test is to observe how well the models priced the factors across all assets 
in given periods. In order to avoid non-independent cross sectional residuals, I use the Fama and 
MacBeth improved two-pass method (Fama & MacBeth, 1973). This two-pass test calculates the 
different factor loadings for each asset through a time-series regression in the first pass. In the 
second pass, asset returns are regressed monthly against their respective betas, obtained in the first 
pass. Finally, the intercept and slopes are averaged. This way of performing regressions gets around 
                                                          
46
 A graphical presentation of the portfolios that shows the performance of a strategy of holding and 
rebalancing the equally weighted average of the highest beta portfolio rather than holding and rebalancing the 
lowest beta portfolio, are provided in the appendix.   
47
 The choice of proxy for the market portfolio has been a heavily debated (Roll, 1976), but research on the 
subject supports that the main index will be a sufficient proxy (Levy & Roll, 2010) 
48
 With the exception of the initial portfolio, that was based on the average of January 2006 due to absence of 
earlier data. 
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the error term correlation problem, without changing the cross sectional estimates. The monthly 
cross-sectional regression tests are run on equation 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. 
The regression results in T alphas, T ERP-factors, T SMB-factors, T VMG-factors, T WMN-factors and T 
HML-factor, where T is the number of months. Average factors are calculated on the basis of these 
results. If the model is valid, the incept alpha should be zero and the slopes should equal the 
observed risk premium for each factor49. The alpha can be evaluated based on a Fama MacBeth 
adjusted t-statistic calculated as: 
            
       
 
   (  )
√ 
 
     (16) 
Where         and         are the average and standard deviation of all alphas.  
In my entire cross sectional tests, I choose not to create portfolios because it might bias the results in 
some direction. Although individual assets might create a lot of noise, the models should in theory be 
able to price them this way.  
In order to best evaluate my hypotheses, I use data from the Norwegian stock exchange, OSEBX50 in 
the period of January 2006 to February 201151.  Although this is a limited period, in terms of 
obtaining a sufficient time series, I find several upsides of using short term data in the light of my 
research. (1) The near term data have a better relevance and predictability than data averaged over 
several macro-economic regimes. (2) Due to the rise of internet trading and information access, the 
influence of liquidity in asset pricing must be studied with post year 2000 – data, in order to be 
representative of how liquidity is priced today. (3) Data in the period provides the opportunity to 
observe changes in the premium caused by the financial crisis in 2008. 
The rationale behind including the financial crisis in 2008 in my data set can be criticized for being 
genuinely unwise. If changes in asset prices are mainly to due to changes in the equity risk premium 
(Cochrane, 2011), I should expect a noisy result from my cross-sectional regression test due to the 
macro-economic changes in the observed period. However, I believe this could be an advantage. 
Given that the risk premium change over time and reflect the market macro-economic view, this 
period offers an unique opportunity to study how these premiums change in periods where there is a 
common understanding of the macro-economic picture. By dividing the cross-sectional regression in 
three – before, during and after the financial crisis5253, I get front row seats to observe changes in the 
                                                          
49
 This would mean the market excess returns in the period would be the same as the average ERP for the 
CAPM test.  
50
 Companies are included from different indexes with different demands to liquidity; OBX, OB Match and OB 
Standard in order to create a representative selection. 
51
 Through Reuter’s Ecowin and Amadeus 2.0 (Thanks to the kindness of “Børsprosjektet” at NHH in Bergen) 
52
 Before (2006-2008), during (2008 – mid-2009) and after (mid-2009 – 2011) 
53 
An alternative to dividing in periods according to the return on the market portfolio, I could also have used a 
more inductive approach – following the main changes in the WMN- and HML-factors. This approach would 
probably provide me with more significant liquidity results, but at the cost of understanding its relation to the 
movement of the market.   
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premium in the given period. Unlike similar tests of equity risk premium models, I ask whether the 
reversed premium is found in times when marginal utility is high. This is the opposite of the standard 
approach of looking for a positive premium, in the form of average excess returns over time. 
Although equilibrium theory demands an opposite and equal cost to findings of these average excess 
returns, this does not necessarily imply a negative premium in recessions. There might be costs of 
trading or economic benefits that is not reflected in market returns. Based on this rationale, it is 
equally relevant to search for consumption-based factors that are rewarded a negative premium in 
recessions.  
In order to avoid changes due to mergers, listing or delisting, that might dominate my results I 
choose to only look at firms that were listed in the entire period. This provided me with 92 
companies’ monthly data points, in a five year period. Although the focus on obtaining a dataset 
without delisting might suggest a survivorship bias, the short term dataset limits such bias.  
Data from the OSEBX is chosen because the stock exchange is illiquid and unexplored, relative to the 
U.S stock exchanges, where most data sets are gathered from. I choose this because effects of 
illiquidity will be even more prominent if the market itself is small and illiquid assets hardly got 
traded at all. A byproduct of this is also a lower probability of data snooping (Chan & Haff, 2005; Lo & 
MacKinlay, 1990). A potential weakness of using Norwegian data from this period is that the financial 
crisis did not have the same impact on the Norwegian economy as other economies. However, the 
ramifications of the 2008–crisis were too large to not affect the Norwegian stock exchange in a 
similar way. 
The standard choice of risk-free rate is usually a one month US Treasury bill (Fama & French, 1996). 
The best approximation of this in the Norwegian market is the efficient NIBOR interest received in 
one month54. This is the rate of return Norwegian traders can expect to receive from a risk-free 
investment. Since the data obtained are listed in 12-month returns, I calculate one month returns 
with equation 26: 
             (         )
 
         (17) 
where rmontly  is the monthly interest rate and ryearly is the yearly interest rate.  
My econometric approach of answering my hypotheses is the natural choice both because the 
models are statistical of nature and because it enables me to compare my results against other 
research.  However, this statistical approach will not explain the human aspect of the risk premium to 
the same degree as other methods, such as interviews or surveys. These methods reflect the trader’s 
expectations, which the risk premium is all about. They also reduce the joint hypothesis problem 
                                                          
54
 This data is retrieved from www.norgesbank.no 
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related to the statistical approach55. However, interviews and surveys might not be representative of 
the complete market – a feature better achieved by the statistical models.  
One of the major concerns of both cross-sectional and time-series regressions is the portfolio 
creation in combination with the calculation of the betas. Jensen, Black and Scholes (1972) and Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) originally developed a method for creating portfolios, calculating the betas, and 
estimating portfolio returns, at different times. If the portfolios are created at the same time that the 
betas are estimated and returns are calculated, high beta portfolios tend to have positive 
measurement errors. However, this is a trade-off I made on order to keep my period short.  
The goal of my portfolio approach is to reveal potential weaknesses of the CAPM and the Fama 
French three-factor model, by improving them with liquidity factors. However, I suspect that this 
approach mainly should be used to test models, and not create new ones. Although I provide support 
for whether a liquidity factor improves the models ability to price assets, I do not fully test the 
augmented models. A real test of the models ability to price assets would be to price single assets or 
testing dummy-portfolios on the liquidity augmented versions of the models.  
  
                                                          
55
 When testing the asset pricing model, one cannot be certain whether a bad of good result is due to the 
model, or the assumptions made about market efficiency and rational investors 
31 
 
In this section I introduce relevant findings from my empirical tests. I first discuss the main result, 
related to the hypotheses, and then other findings, substantiating the main results. 
I find that the bid-ask spread and turnover factor explains asset returns (Table 4) and that none of 
the liquidity factors improve the alphas or adjusted R2 noticeably in either model (Table 5 and 6). 
In general, all results are affected by the market factors ability to explain returns in the period. The 
CAPM has only one portfolio with significant non-zero alphas at 95% significance level, in all 
regressions tests. The GRS-tests thus validate the CAPM as fully capable to price assets. Table 5 and 
6, show an example of the marginal improvement of alphas and adjusted R2 provided by adding 
significant bid-ask spread-betas. Since the additional factors provide only marginal contribution to 
alphas and R2, the significance and ability to price portfolios in a given direction is my only indication 
of whether a liquidity factor is priced.  
Table 4, summarizes whether the different regressions test provided three or more significant 
liquidity factors that price portfolios in a monotonic direction. A green circle indicates the results 
support the hypothesis, a red cross indicates the results are unsupportive of the hypothesis and a 
line indicated the results are inconclusive or noisy. I observe that the liquidity factors are able to 
explain the beta portfolios and liquidity portfolios, but are unable to explain the size and value 
portfolios. These observations are similar on both the liquidity augmented versions of the CAPM and 
the liquidity augmented versions of the Fama French model. The fact that I observe significant factors 
both in the cross-sectional and time-series test means that the two factors to able to explain returns 
both over time and across assets. Although both liquidity proxies are able to explain returns on 
portfolios created according to their respective characteristics, the bid-ask spread is able to explain 
beta portfolios as well (table 5 and 6).   
Table 4: Summary of time-series and cross-sectional regressions tests.   
Cross-sectional Total Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis   
H1: Improved CAPM - х O х   
H2: Unimproved Fama French - O х O   
            
Time-series Beta Size Value Spread Turnover 
H1: Improved CAPM O х х O O 
H2: Unimproved Fama French х O O х х 
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Table 5 (left) Results of time-series regression test on beta sorted portfolios (low to high beta) in CAPM.     
Table 6 (right): Results of time-series regression test on beta sorted portfolios (low to high beta) on bid-ask spread and 
turnover augmented version of the CAPM.  
Beta
Portfolio 1
p-value
Portfolio 2
p-value
Portfolio 3
p-value
Portfolio 4
p-value
Portfolio 5
p-value
W
p         
R2 α β
0,30 0,00 0,40
0,99 0,00
0,75 -0,39 0,65
0,23 0,00
0,86 -0,19 0,93
0,57 0,00
0,93 0,24 1,17
0,40 0,00
0,85 0,19 1,86
0,77 0,00
0,01
1,00        
R2 α β l w
0,33 -0,10 0,56 0,28 0,37
0,85 0,00 0,16 0,05
0,78 -0,40 0,69 -0,08 0,24
0,22 0,00 0,47 0,03
0,87 -0,33 1,03 0,12 0,31
0,31 0,00 0,30 0,01
0,93 0,25 1,15 0,12 -0,19
0,37 0,00 0,23 0,05
0,88 0,46 1,54 -0,54 -0,77
0,47 0,00 0,02 0,00
0,01
1,00  
I find that a positive liquidity premium and a negative value premium are rewarded in recessions. 
I find several indications of a positive liquidity premium in 2008 in combination with a negative value 
premium in the same period. Figure 5, shows how both liquidity factors increase during the market 
collapse, while the value factor falls at the same time. Additional support is also found in the 
correlation matrix (table 7) where the bid-ask spread and turnover factors are negatively correlated 
with the market, while the value factor is positively correlated. The cross-sectional results from the 
crisis support that the bid-ask spread and value factors explain returns, but the turnover is 
insignificant (table 8). Despite its insignificance, I observe that the turnover factor makes the alphas 
less significant. 
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Figure 5: Accumulated monthly returns (%) of factors in the period 2006-2011.  
 
Table 7: Correlation between the factors in the period 2006-2011. 
Rm - Rf VMG SMB LMH WMN
Rm - Rf 1
VMG 0,24 1
SMB -0,35 -0,09 1
LMH -0,51 -0,07 0,11 1
WMN -0,49 -0,34 0,25 0,09 1  
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Table 8: Results from cross-sectional regression from 2008 - mid 2009 on all models. FF represent the Fama French three-
factor model, WMG represent a bid-ask spread augmented model, LMH represent a turnover-augmented model and 
2LIQ represents a model that contains both liquidity proxies.   
Crisis (2008) alpha ERP WMN LMH SMB VMG
CAPM -2,62 -2,70
p-value 0,28 0,51
CAPM + WMG -4,02 -1,28 2,96
p-value 0,17 0,78 0,04
CAPM + LMH -1,67 -3,68 -1,59
p-value 0,44 0,33 0,43
CAPM + 2LIQ -2,90 -2,43 3,02 -1,80
p-value 0,25 0,56 0,04 0,40
FF -2,66 -2,67 -0,67 -2,68
p-value 0,24 0,51 0,76 0,03
FF + WMN -3,44 -1,87 2,67 -0,87 -2,22
p-value 0,22 0,68 0,04 0,70 0,04
FF + LMH -1,66 -3,68 -1,34 -0,47 -2,48
p-value 0,37 0,31 0,50 0,83 0,04
FF + 2LIQ -2,27 -3,07 2,77 -1,50 -0,61 -2,20
p-value 0,33 0,44 0,04 0,48 0,78 0,05  
 
I find a large, negative size premium in the post-crisis regressions. 
The cross-sectional regression of the period after 2008 shows a negative and significant size factor 
(table 9). This finding is supported by the time-series regression. In table 10, I observe that the size 
factor explains the size portfolios over time better than the beta, which is reasonably flat. Finally, the 
correlation matrix in table 7, indicate a negative correlation between size and the market in the 
period. 
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Table 9: Results from cross-sectional regression from mid 2009 - 2011 on all models. FF represent the Fama French three-
factor model, WMG represent a bid-ask spread augmented model, LMH represent a turnover-augmented model and 
2LIQ represents a model that contains both liquidity proxies.   
Post-crisis alpha ERP WMN LMH SMB VMG
CAPM 0,28 2,43
p-value 0,76 0,13
CAPM + WMG 0,38 2,32 -0,76
p-value 0,64 0,11 0,39
CAPM + LMH -0,11 2,83 0,32
p-value 0,91 0,09 0,64
CAPM + 2LIQ -0,21 2,93 -0,79 0,30
p-value 0,82 0,07 0,37 0,63
FF 0,58 2,12 -1,54 0,10
p-value 0,51 0,17 0,06 0,88
FF + WMN 0,63 2,07 -0,67 -1,53 0,07
p-value 0,44 0,14 0,45 0,06 0,91
FF + LMH 0,15 2,56 0,40 -1,63 0,02
p-value 0,87 0,12 0,57 0,05 0,98
FF + 2LIQ 0,06 2,65 -0,72 0,38 -1,65 0,06
p-value 0,95 0,09 0,41 0,55 0,04 0,93  
Table 10: Results of time-series regression on size portfolios (small to large size) on bid-ask spread augmented Fama 
French three-factor model. 
Size R2 α β v s l w
Portfolio 1 0,75 0,74 0,85 -0,04 0,55 -0,56 0,01
p-value 0,14 0,00 0,85 0,00 0,00 0,94
Portfolio 2 0,84 -0,36 1,19 -0,04 0,41 0,44 0,13
p-value 0,37 0,00 0,79 0,00 0,00 0,34
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,26 0,99 0,13 -0,09 0,07 0,02
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,40 0,38 0,64 0,88
Portfolio 4 0,86 -0,02 0,95 -0,02 -0,27 0,02 0,15
p-value 0,96 0,00 0,91 0,01 0,88 0,23
Portfolio 5 0,94 -0,56 1,02 -0,03 -0,54 0,03 -0,29
p-value 0,05 0,00 0,80 0,00 0,75 0,01
W 0,38
p 0,86  
I find that the size factor and the bid-ask spread factor explains returns on assets differently, 
despite their positive correlation.  
I observe that both the portfolios of small cap with narrow bid-ask spread and the portfolio with 
small cap and wide bid-ask spread outperforms the two similar portfolios with large market 
capitalization (figure 6). However, in the market collapse, returns depend on whether assets have a 
wide or narrow bid-ask spread. I observe that the illiquid portfolios outperform the liquid portfolios 
in the recession, independently of market capitalization. In support of this finding, I also find that 
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both spread and size explain asset returns in the-time series regression on the beta portfolio (table 
11). They appear to price assets in the same direction without reducing each other.  
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Figure 6: Accumulated monthly returns (%) on orthogonal portfolios based on size and spread. 
 
Table 11: Results of time-series regression on beta portfolios (high to low beta) on bid-ask spread augmented Fama 
French three-factor model.  
Beta R
2
α β v s w
Portfolio 1 0,45 0,07 0,55 0,09 0,51 0,27
p-value 0,88 0,00 0,64 0,00 0,11
Portfolio 2 0,77 -0,41 0,72 -0,22 0,01 0,20
p-value 0,19 0,00 0,08 0,92 0,07
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,18 1,02 -0,13 0,12 0,25
p-value 0,55 0,00 0,30 0,18 0,03
Portfolio 4 0,94 0,21 1,08 0,03 -0,21 -0,19
p-value 0,41 0,00 0,78 0,00 0,04
Portfolio 5 0,88 0,17 1,62 0,27 -0,44 -0,54
p-value 0,78 0,00 0,26 0,01 0,01
W 0,15
p 0,98  
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My main result can be interpreted in several ways. One way is to conclude that the two significant 
liquidity proxies are statistical deviations caused by a volatile period in the stock market. They do not 
appear to have the same impact on the models as the size and value factor, and the GRS-tests and 
alpha results suggest that the Sharp-Lintner CAPM is sufficient to explain all asset returns. Several 
factors are also insignificant, showing no ability to explain returns on either portfolio. Had the only 
goal of these asset pricing models been empirical performance, I would have supported the CAPM – 
based on my results from this period. However, the spread factor, WMN, appears to price both beta, 
spread and turnover portfolios in a given direction. Although somewhat less impressive, the ability to 
price portfolios in a simple direction is also showed by the turnover factor, LMH, on the turnover 
portfolios. These results are inconsistent with both the Black (1972) and the Sharp-Lintner (1964) 
version of the CAPM because they indicate that beta alone is insufficient to explain asset returns.  
Another way of interpreting the results is by recognizing the factors as significant, but reject them as 
priced factors because their ability to improve the CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model is 
negligible – making the significant results unimportant in practice. However, the fact that I find 
significant results, indicating that the market cares about liquidity when pricing assets, point towards 
that both the CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model are unable to fully appreciate liquidity. 
Although the impact on accuracy of the models is somewhat disappointing, the significant factors 
suggest that our understanding of asset pricing is not complete without adjusting for liquidity. My 
initial conclusion, based only on the empirical findings, is that the added liquidity factors improve 
both models.  
Although the factors were created in order to reflect different dimensions of liquidity, there is no 
guarantee that the significant factors of my results reflect liquidity. This is why there is little reward 
in finding significant factors without a proper theoretical rationale. I will therefore try to explain my 
significant results in the light of the consumption-based model and my other findings. 
Based on my theoretical research, I predicted that recessions will cause a flight-to-liquidity (Acharya 
& Pedersen, 2005; Amihud, Mendelson, & Wood, 1990; Amihud, 2002) and increased opportunity 
costs (Grossman & Miller, 1987)  as well as lower ability to fund companies – increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy among illiquid firms (Lustig & Chien, 2001; Liu, 2006). Archarya and 
Pedersen (2005), Amihud (2002), Amihud, Mendelson and Wood (1990) and Lustig and Chien (2001) 
all suggest that these risks will cause illiquid assets to provide lower returns when consumption is 
low and a premium when consumption is high – consistent with utility theory (Cochrane, 2001). 
Inspired by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1996), I also suggested that 
the bid-ask spread would be a good proxy for the premium rewarded to market makers and that the 
turnover would be a good proxy for the risk premium related to the increased risk of bankruptcy of 
illiquid companies in recessions. According to Amihud (2002), I also had reason to expect a 
correlation between the risk of bankruptcy and the size effect.  Based on these rationales, I expected 
both the bid-ask spread and the turnover factor to be negative in 2008 – consistent with the findings 
from the October 1987 crash (Amihud, Mendelson, & Wood, 1990).  
Contrary to my beliefs, the results of the cross-sectional regressions in 2008, the time-series 
regressions and the correlation matrix suggest that stocks with wide bid-ask spreads, provide higher 
excess returns when consumption is low. Provided that the positive premium is not a result of my 
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limited sample size – causing some companies extreme performance to dominate the average 
returns, I find no evidence of a flight-to-liquidity in recessions as Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
suggests.  
The results appear inconsistent with both intuition and literature. In theory, I should have observed a 
reversed premium as a natural response to the findings of a positive premium in bull markets 
(Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996; Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Datar, Naik, & Radcliffe, 1998; Keim 
& Madhavan, 1996). However, I find little research actually controlling whether this negative 
premium takes place in recessions. Although equilibrium theory demands an opposite and equally 
large cost (Cochrane, 2001), this does not imply that it is found in the form of lower excess returns. 
Perhaps researchers have, wrongfully, assumed that the observed liquidity premium from turnover 
and bid-ask spread implicate a harder punishment of illiquid assets when markets plummet. My 
results suggest they might have. However, a positive liquidity premium in market crashes is 
inconsistent with the results Amihud found in the 1987 October crash (Amihud, Mendelson, & Wood, 
1990) – which indicated that liquid stock outperformed the illiquid stocks in the collapse and was 
explained as a flight-to-liquidity.  
The main difference between my results and the results of Amihud, Mendelson and Wood is that no 
macro-economic recessions followed the crisis of October 1987. This suggests that the events of 
October 1987 were more likely a case of panic in the marketplace, rather than a miss-estimation of 
underlying growth or changes in consumption. The authors themselves argue that this was the first 
time the stock market tested liquidity limitations, and that the cause of the crash was realization of 
the illiquidity of the market place. One explanation could therefore be that the 1987- crash was a 
correction, where illiquid assets had, over time, received to high premium due to the increase in 
market liquidity. My results suggest that the market has learned and that the events of 2008 were 
not a case of flight-to-liquidity, but a more rational response to the state of the economy.  
Nevertheless, I recognize the results of Amihud, Mendelson and Wood as one of the most important 
weaknesses of my results. In support of their case, it could be argued that my Norwegian dataset is 
biased by the fact that this market is heavily weighted in favor of the energy sector (Næs, Skjeltorp, & 
Ødegaard, 2007). If liquidity is priced differently in different sectors, my results would not account 
for an overweight of certain sectors. It could for example be argued that oil companies are more 
capital intensive and more dependent on the possibility of equity offerings. This would suggest that 
the OSEBX is a poor sample to draw generic conclusions from. Although this is a weakness that 
should be adjusted for in further research, it is somewhat reduced by my choice of using equally 
weighted company returns.  
A possible explanation of the absence of the flight-to-liquidity could be that market makers hold 
illiquid stock because they don’t have a liquidation need, even in recessions. Assuming that stocks 
were sold at fire-sale prices in the fall of 2008, this may not have been the case for stocks held by 
long-term investors. As discussed in the theory chapter; if investors are expected to be rational, they 
will not own illiquid assets which they are forced to sell at fire-sale prices in recessions. My results 
indicate that owners of illiquid assets are able, and willing, to hold their assets through recessions. 
Due to the fact that the separation between liquid an illiquid assets is not a binary state, this balance 
is continuous. However, my findings suggest that traders, on average, act rationally and decide the 
level of liquidity of their assets based on their own ability to outlast recessions.  
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The theory about market makers with long term investment horizons sounds plausible. However, if a 
market maker liquidity premium is paid in recessions, equilibrium theory states that the premium has 
an equally large cost. In theory, this could be average negative returns in the years before the 
collapse, but I don’t find any significant negative premium in the other cross-sectional periods. This 
could be a result of my limited dataset, unable to observe these small negative premiums over time. 
However, a positive bid-ask spread premium has been observed in longer time series – also in the 
Norwegian market (Næs, Skjeltorp, & Ødegaard, 2007). A more plausible explanation is therefore 
that the costs faced by market makers are the increased transaction costs and opportunity costs of 
illiquid assets faced also outside recessions. These costs would not be reflected in excess returns, but 
would still be real costs for the market makers. Alternatively, the market makers could be rewarded 
the premium in recessions for facing information risk (O'Hara, 2003; Easley, Hvidkjær, & O'Hara, 
2002) – caused by asymmetrical access to information in the marketplace.   
I find support for the market maker theory as an interesting byproduct of the tests on the Fama 
French factors. As mentioned in the theory chapter, the rationale behind the value effect is that 
companies with low price-to-book ratios are leveraged and cyclical – causing them to be vulnerable 
to a fall in consumption (Zhang, 2005). However, from a liquidity point-of-view, companies with high 
price-to-book ratios are growth companies that might be held by investors with long term intentions. 
This theory coincides with the large negative correlation between the spread factor and the value 
factor. However, the two factors are able to co-exist without reducing one another, suggesting that 
neither factor is a perfect measure of the flight-to-liquidity risk and opportunity costs or that both 
also explain other risks. 
What about the risk of bankruptcy? So far I have discussed the results of the bid-ask spread, 
neglecting that the turnover factor remains insignificant in the cross-sectional sample. Due to the 
disappointing turnover results, I will not be able to consider whether it might explain bankruptcy risk. 
My suggested explanation on how market makers avoid fire-sales in recessions might explain the 
wrongful assumption about the flight-to-liquidity, but does not explain the fact that some companies 
will underperform as a consequence of lowered ability to attract funding. My theory of balancing the 
observed positive illiquidity premium observed in 2008 with opportunity costs also leaves the 
premium observed in bull markets by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Datar, Naik and Radcliffe 
(1998), and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), unexplained. The missing negative premium, 
intended to compensate for bankruptcy risk, may be a result of my small sample size or that the 
Norwegian market was not affected as hard as other markets by the credit crunch. I do, however, 
suggest another explanation.  
Although the collapse was in 2008, the economic consequences of the crisis were first noticeable 
after the crisis. Based on this rationale, my expectation of a negative turnover premium in 2008 
might be premature. Perhaps I should expect to find lower returns on illiquid stocks in the post-2008 
period. Although none of the liquidity-factors are significant in this period, the results of the cross-
sectional tests show a large negative size factor in the post-2008 regression.  
Consistent with Amihud (2002) – one of the arguments behind the size effect is that small companies 
run a larger risk of bankruptcy in recessions and should be rewarded a premium as they, on average, 
have lower returns when marginal utility is high and consumption is low. In the light of my earlier 
speculations about the multiple dimensions of liquidity, this could be interpreted as size being a 
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proxy for a dimension of liquidity, not accounted for by the bid-ask spread. This is also consistent 
with the co-existence of size and spread found in tests performed on the Norwegian stock market 
(Næs, Skjeltorp, & Ødegaard, 2007). This explanation of the size-effect coincides with market 
efficiency because the premium is paid as a rational compensation for an illiquidity costs. An 
interesting byproduct of this theory could be an explanation of the weakening of the size-effect 
observed since its discovery in 1980 – as it would correlate with the increase in internet trading from 
around this period (Amihud, 2000).  
If the size factor accounts for the illiquidity risk of being unable to perform equity offerings in 
recessions and the spread factor represent the market maker premium of holding illiquid assets due 
to opportunity costs, this leaves the problem of explaining the strong correlation between the spread 
and the size factor. Both the time-series tests of the spread portfolios and the correlation matrix 
suggest that these factors explain similar effects. However, the result of the two factors plotted 
orthogonal to each other (figure 6) show a large spread between the returns on small and large 
companies, occurring independently of the spread. Although this might suggest that the spread is a 
proxy for the size effect, I find that the outperformance of portfolios with wide spread occurs 
independently of the market cap in recessions. This support my theory that the spread and the size 
factor have different ability to explain asset returns. These results also support my suggestion of the 
multidimensional liquidity risks and the several proxies are needed to fully explain the effects of 
liquidity.  
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The results of my research support O’Hara in her claim that asset pricing models need to be cast in 
broader terms to incorporate liquidity costs. I find significant liquidity factors that provide improved 
insight in the pricing of assets for both the CAPM and the Fama French three-factor model –
confirming the first and rejecting the second hypothesis on the basis of my empirical results. 
Although the models’ abilities to explain returns are only marginally improved, the byproducts of my 
findings could have large implications for our understanding of asset pricing. My results suggest that 
liquidity risk is multidimensional and that several factors explain several risks. However, some factors 
appear to price certain risks better than others.  
I explain the positive excess returns on stocks with high price-to-book ratios and wide bid-ask spread 
as a premium paid to market makers, holding illiquid assets through recessions – adding a liquidity 
based rationale behind the value effect (Reinganum, 1980; Fama & French, 1992). I balance this 
premium with the liquidity cost of the market maker in the shape of opportunity cost and transaction 
cost, not reflected in returns. The market marker premium is thus the ability to outperform the 
market in recessions – contradicting the flight-to-liquidity theory (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; 
Amihud, 2002).  
Further, my results suggest that company market cap is a better indicator of a funding risk premium 
than turnover and the bid-ask spread. The risk of lower funding ability in recessions leads to a cost in 
the period after the collapse, when the economy struggles and illiquid companies go bankrupt. This 
cost is well captured by the market capitalization of companies and the bid-ask spread in bull 
markets (Basu, 1977; Fama & French, 1992; Amihud & Mendelson, 1986), but according to my 
observation better explained by the size factor, alone, post-recessions. 
Although my liquidity factors don’t appear to be the holy grail of asset pricing models, they have 
provided a contribution to the understanding of how liquidity affects asset pricing. Further research 
should look into the positive premium awarded to market makers in recessions by assessing how 
different liquidity factors performed in other crisis. I also recommend researchers to look for a 
correlation between value and liquidity, as well as size and liquidity, across different sectors. Finally, I 
recommend my approach of looking for reversed premiums in recessions, regardless of the factor in 
question, as it provides insight beyond average returns in long term time-series. 
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Figure 7 (left): Accumulated monthly return from equally weighted portfolios with high and low beta respectfully.  
Figure 8 (right): Accumulated simple average of equally weighted portfolios with high and low size, name respectively 
large cap and small cap  
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Figure 9 (left): Accumulated simple average of equally weighted portfolios with low and high price-to-book ratio, named 
respectively Value and Growth.   
Figure 10 (right):Accumulated simple average of equally weighted portfolios with high and low bid-ask spread, name 
respectively Illiquid Spread avg and Liquid Spread avg.  
 
Figur 11 (left): Accumulated simple average of equally weighted portfolios with high and low turnover, name respectively 
Illiquid Turnover avg and Liquid Turnover avg.  
Figure 12 (right): Accumulated difference in holding illiquid and liquid portfolios if stock, where portfolios are rebalanced 
yearly based on the previous 12 month bid ask spread and turnover. The data is from the period 2006 – 2010. 
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Table 12: Cross- sectional tests. Entire period 2006-2011 
2006-2011 alpha ERP WMN IML SMB VMG
CAPM -0,44 0,93
p-value 0,52 0,40
CAPM + WMG -0,74 1,24 0,28
p-value 0,32 0,28 0,60
CAPM + IML -0,47 0,97 -0,15
p-value 0,46 0,37 0,78
CAPM + 2LIQ -0,89 1,39 0,27 -0,22
p-value 0,20 0,21 0,61 0,69
FF -0,30 0,80 -0,77 -0,17
p-value 0,64 0,46 0,19 0,67
FF + WMN -0,61 1,11 0,38 -0,85 0,01
p-value 0,39 0,33 0,46 0,16 0,99
FF + IML -0,34 0,83 -0,09 -0,78 -0,18
p-value 0,57 0,43 0,86 0,18 0,66
FF + 2LIQ -0,74 1,24 0,37 -0,20 -0,88 0,00
p-value 0,27 0,26 0,47 0,71 0,14 0,99  
 
 
 
Table 13: Cross-sectional test. Pre-crisis 2006-2008 
Pre-crisis alpha ERP WMN LMH SMB VMG
CAPM 0,09 1,50
p-value 0,92 0,09
CAPM + WMG 0,00 1,59 -0,21
p-value 1,00 0,08 0,78
CAPM + LMH -0,15 1,75 0,21
p-value 0,88 0,05 0,72
CAPM + 2LIQ -0,43 2,02 -0,23 0,16
p-value 0,64 0,03 0,76 0,79
FF 0,15 1,43 -0,03 1,00
p-value 0,87 0,13 0,96 0,06
FF + WMN -0,26 1,86 0,14 -0,14 1,24
p-value 0,76 0,06 0,87 0,83 0,04
FF + LMH -0,07 1,67 0,13 -0,08 0,95
p-value 0,94 0,09 0,82 0,90 0,06
FF + 2LIQ -0,67 2,28 0,11 -0,03 -0,23 1,23
p-value 0,50 0,03 0,91 0,95 0,72 0,04  
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Table 14: Cross-sectional test. Crisis 2008 – mid 2009. 
Crisis (2008) alpha ERP WMN LMH SMB VMG
CAPM -2,62 -2,70
p-value 0,28 0,51
CAPM + WMG -4,02 -1,28 2,96
p-value 0,17 0,78 0,04
CAPM + LMH -1,67 -3,68 -1,59
p-value 0,44 0,33 0,43
CAPM + 2LIQ -2,90 -2,43 3,02 -1,80
p-value 0,25 0,56 0,04 0,40
FF -2,66 -2,67 -0,67 -2,68
p-value 0,24 0,51 0,76 0,03
FF + WMN -3,44 -1,87 2,67 -0,87 -2,22
p-value 0,22 0,68 0,04 0,70 0,04
FF + LMH -1,66 -3,68 -1,34 -0,47 -2,48
p-value 0,37 0,31 0,50 0,83 0,04
FF + 2LIQ -2,27 -3,07 2,77 -1,50 -0,61 -2,20
p-value 0,33 0,44 0,04 0,48 0,78 0,05  
 
Table 15: Cross-sectional test. Post-crisis mid 2009-2011 
Post-crisis alpha ERP WMN LMH SMB VMG
CAPM 0,28 2,43
p-value 0,76 0,13
CAPM + WMG 0,38 2,32 -0,76
p-value 0,64 0,11 0,39
CAPM + LMH -0,11 2,83 0,32
p-value 0,91 0,09 0,64
CAPM + 2LIQ -0,21 2,93 -0,79 0,30
p-value 0,82 0,07 0,37 0,63
FF 0,58 2,12 -1,54 0,10
p-value 0,51 0,17 0,06 0,88
FF + WMN 0,63 2,07 -0,67 -1,53 0,07
p-value 0,44 0,14 0,45 0,06 0,91
FF + LMH 0,15 2,56 0,40 -1,63 0,02
p-value 0,87 0,12 0,57 0,05 0,98
FF + 2LIQ 0,06 2,65 -0,72 0,38 -1,65 0,06
p-value 0,95 0,09 0,41 0,55 0,04 0,93   
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Table 16: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, CAPM 
Beta R2 α β
Portfolio 1 0,30 0,00 0,40
p-value 0,99 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,75 -0,39 0,65
p-value 0,23 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,86 -0,19 0,93
p-value 0,57 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,93 0,24 1,17
p-value 0,40 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,85 0,19 1,86
p-value 0,77 0,00
W 0,01
p 1,00  
Table 17: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor 
Beta R2 α β l
Portfolio 1 0,29 -0,08 0,45 0,19
p-value 0,89 0,00 0,32
Portfolio 2 0,76 -0,38 0,62 -0,14
p-value 0,26 0,00 0,23
Portfolio 3 0,86 -0,30 0,94 0,05
p-value 0,38 0,00 0,45
Portfolio 4 0,93 0,00 1,21 0,17
p-value 0,41 0,00 0,11
Portfolio 5 0,86 0,40 1,77 -0,36
p-value 0,56 0,00 0,15
W 0,52
p 0,76  
Table 18: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, CAPM with bid-ask spread factor 
Beta R2 α β w
Portfolio 1 0,32 0,01 0,48 0,30
p-value 0,98 0,00 0,09
Portfolio 2 0,77 -0,39 0,71 0,25
p-value 0,22 0,00 0,02
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,18 1,00 0,29
p-value 0,56 0,00 0,01
Portfolio 4 0,93 0,23 1,11 -0,22
p-value 0,40 0,00 0,02
Portfolio 5 0,87 0,18 1,70 -0,64
p-value 0,77 0,00 0,00
W 0,03
p 1,00  
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Table 19: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor and bid-ask spread factor 
Beta R2 α β l w
Portfolio 1 0,33 -0,10 0,56 0,28 0,37
p-value 0,85 0,00 0,16 0,05
Portfolio 2 0,78 -0,40 0,69 -0,08 0,24
p-value 0,22 0,00 0,47 0,03
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,33 1,03 0,12 0,31
p-value 0,31 0,00 0,30 0,01
Portfolio 4 0,93 0,25 1,15 0,12 -0,19
p-value 0,37 0,00 0,23 0,05
Portfolio 5 0,88 0,46 1,54 -0,54 -0,77
p-value 0,47 0,00 0,02 0,00
W 0,01
p 1,00  
Table 20: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, Fama French three-factor model 
Beta R2 α β v s
Portfolio 1 0,43 0,06 0,50 0,01 0,53
p-value 0,90 0,00 0,97 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,76 -0,42 0,68 -0,28 0,02
p-value 0,18 0,00 0,03 0,78
Portfolio 3 0,86 -0,19 0,97 -0,21 0,13
p-value 0,54 0,00 0,10 0,13
Portfolio 4 0,94 0,22 1,12 0,09 -0,23
p-value 0,40 0,00 0,41 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,87 0,19 1,73 0,43 -0,48
p-value 0,75 0,00 0,08 0,01
W 0,13
p 0,98  
Table 21: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with bid-ask spread factor 
Beta R2 α β v s w
Portfolio 1 0,45 0,07 0,55 0,09 0,51 0,27
p-value 0,88 0,00 0,64 0,00 0,11
Portfolio 2 0,77 -0,41 0,72 -0,22 0,01 0,20
p-value 0,19 0,00 0,08 0,92 0,07
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,18 1,02 -0,13 0,12 0,25
p-value 0,55 0,00 0,30 0,18 0,03
Portfolio 4 0,94 0,21 1,08 0,03 -0,21 -0,19
p-value 0,41 0,00 0,78 0,00 0,04
Portfolio 5 0,88 0,17 1,62 0,27 -0,44 -0,54
p-value 0,78 0,00 0,26 0,01 0,01
W 0,15
p 0,98  
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Table 22: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor 
Beta R2 α β v s l
Portfolio 1 0,45 0,07 0,57 0,02 0,58 0,25
p-value 0,88 0,00 0,92 0,00 0,15
Portfolio 2 0,78 -0,44 0,65 -0,29 0,00 -0,12
p-value 0,17 0,00 0,02 0,97 0,29
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,33 0,99 -0,24 0,13 0,08
p-value 0,33 0,00 0,07 0,18 0,52
Portfolio 4 0,94 0,20 1,15 0,08 -0,22 0,14
p-value 0,46 0,00 0,43 0,01 0,16
Portfolio 5 0,88 0,38 1,61 0,47 -0,51 -0,44
p-value 0,55 0,00 0,06 0,01 0,06
W 0,51
p 0,77  
 
Table 23: Time-series regression, beta portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor and bid ask 
spread factor 
Beta R2 α β v s l w
Portfolio 1 0,48 0,06 0,66 0,11 0,56 0,32 0,34
p-value 0,89 0,00 0,55 0,00 0,07 0,05
Portfolio 2 0,79 -0,45 0,70 -0,23 -0,01 -0,08 0,19
p-value 0,16 0,00 0,07 0,91 0,48 0,09
Portfolio 3 0,88 -0,33 1,06 -0,16 0,11 0,13 0,26
p-value 0,30 0,00 0,21 0,23 0,26 0,02
Portfolio 4 0,94 0,21 1,11 0,04 -0,21 0,11 -0,16
p-value 0,45 0,00 0,73 0,01 0,28 0,10
Portfolio 5 0,90 0,40 1,44 0,28 -0,47 -0,58 -0,66
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,24 0,01 0,01 0,00
W 0,12
p 0,99  
Table 22: Time-series regression, size portfolios, CAPM 
Size R2 α β
Portfolio 1 0,64 0,44 0,88
p-value 0,44 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,78 -0,29 0,97
p-value 0,51 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,86 0,26 1,00
p-value 0,46 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,08 0,96
p-value 0,81 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,87 -0,45 1,18
p-value 0,25 0,00
W 0,12
p 0,99  
  
48 
 
Table 23: Time-series regression, size portfolios, CAPM with bid-ask spread factor 
Size R2 α β w
Portfolio 1 0,64 0,45 0,92 0,18
p-value 0,43 0,00 0,35
Portfolio 2 0,78 -0,28 0,99 0,11
p-value 0,52 0,00 0,45
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,26 0,99 -0,03
p-value 0,46 0,00 0,78
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,08 0,99 0,12
p-value 0,81 0,00 0,29
Portfolio 5 0,89 -0,46 1,09 -0,35
p-value 0,21 0,00 0,01
W 1,64
p 0,17  
Table 24: Time-series regression, size portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor  
Size R2 α β l
Portfolio 1 0,69 0,61 0,72 -0,63
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,80 -0,44 1,05 0,36
p-value 0,31 0,00 0,02
Portfolio 3 0,86 0,25 1,02 0,08
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,11
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,00 0,97 0,01
p-value 0,86 0,00 0,93
Portfolio 5 0,88 -0,44 1,22 0,15
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,28
W 4,40
p 0,00  
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Table 25: Time-series regression, size portfolios, CAPM with bid-ask spread factor and turnover factor 
Size R2 α β l w
Portfolio 1 0,69 0,61 0,75 -0,61 0,08
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,68
Portfolio 2 0,81 -0,45 1,11 0,41 0,18
p-value 0,30 0,00 0,01 0,21
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,25 1,01 0,07 -0,02
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,59 0,89
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,06 1,00 0,04 0,13
p-value 0,88 0,00 0,76 0,31
Portfolio 5 0,89 -0,41 1,12 0,08 -0,33
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,58 0,01
W 0,20
p 0,96  
 
Table 25: Time-series regression, size portfolios, Fama French three-factor model  
Size R2 α β v s
Portfolio 1 0,72 0,49 1,00 -0,09 0,60
p-value 0,33 0,00 0,65 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,81 -0,26 1,04 -0,06 0,37
p-value 0,53 0,00 0,69 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,86 0,26 0,96 0,12 -0,11
p-value 0,45 0,00 0,38 0,28
Portfolio 4 0,86 0,05 0,92 -0,04 -0,24
p-value 0,87 0,00 0,75 0,01
Portfolio 5 0,93 -0,50 1,07 0,07 -0,56
p-value 0,09 0,00 0,55 0,00
W 0,23
p 0,95  
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Table 27: Time-series regression, size portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with bid-ask spread factor 
Size R2 α β v s w
Portfolio 1 0,71 0,50 1,02 -0,06 0,59 0,11
p-value 0,33 0,00 0,78 0,00 0,54
Portfolio 2 0,81 -0,25 1,05 -0,04 0,36 0,07
p-value 0,54 0,00 0,79 0,00 0,65
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,26 0,97 0,12 -0,11 0,00
p-value 0,46 0,00 0,40 0,28 0,97
Portfolio 4 0,87 0,06 0,95 0,00 -0,25 0,15
p-value 0,86 0,00 0,97 0,01 0,20
Portfolio 5 0,94 -0,51 1,01 -0,02 -0,54 -0,30
p-value 0,06 0,00 0,84 0,00 0,00
W 0,16
p 0,98  
Table 26: Time-series regression, size portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover  
Size R2 α β v s l
Portfolio 1 0,76 0,74 0,85 -0,04 0,55 -0,56
p-value 0,14 0,00 0,83 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,84 -0,36 1,15 -0,08 0,42 0,41
p-value 0,37 0,00 0,60 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,26 0,98 0,12 -0,09 0,06
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,40 0,38 0,65
Portfolio 4 0,86 -0,01 0,92 -0,06 -0,26 -0,01
p-value 0,97 0,00 0,66 0,01 0,92
Portfolio 5 0,93 -0,56 1,09 0,05 -0,56 0,09
p-value 0,06 0,00 0,64 0,00 0,39
W 3,69
p 0,01  
Table 27: Time-series regression, size portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor and bid-ask spread 
factor 
Size R2 α β v s l w
Portfolio 1 0,75 0,74 0,85 -0,04 0,55 -0,56 0,01
p-value 0,14 0,00 0,85 0,00 0,00 0,94
Portfolio 2 0,84 -0,36 1,19 -0,04 0,41 0,44 0,13
p-value 0,37 0,00 0,79 0,00 0,00 0,34
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,26 0,99 0,13 -0,09 0,07 0,02
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,40 0,38 0,64 0,88
Portfolio 4 0,86 -0,02 0,95 -0,02 -0,27 0,02 0,15
p-value 0,96 0,00 0,91 0,01 0,88 0,23
Portfolio 5 0,94 -0,56 1,02 -0,03 -0,54 0,03 -0,29
p-value 0,05 0,00 0,80 0,00 0,75 0,01
W 0,38
p 0,86  
  
51 
 
Table 28: Time-series regression, value portfolios, CAPM  
Value R2 α β
Portfolio 1 0,86 -0,36 1,10
p-value 0,44 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,82 -0,24 0,91
p-value 0,58 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,88 -0,14 1,01
p-value 0,71 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,88 -0,14 1,01
p-value 0,71 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,78 0,12 0,90
p-value 0,81 0,00
W 0,16
p 0,98  
Table 29: Time-series regression, value portfolios, CAPM with bid-ask spread factor 
Value R2 α β w
Portfolio 1 0,87 -0,44 1,00 -0,38
p-value 0,32 0,00 0,02
Portfolio 2 0,83 -0,30 0,84 -0,26
p-value 0,49 0,00 0,09
Portfolio 3 0,88 -0,12 1,04 0,12
p-value 0,76 0,00 0,39
Portfolio 4 0,84 0,11 0,88 0,12
p-value 0,77 0,00 0,40
Portfolio 5 0,80 0,21 1,00 0,41
p-value 0,66 0,00 0,02
W 0,21
p 0,96  
Table 30: Time-series regression, value portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor  
Value R2 α β l
Portfolio 1 0,87 -0,59 1,11 0,09
p-value 0,21 0,00 0,54
Portfolio 2 0,82 -0,32 0,92 0,08
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,59
Portfolio 3 0,89 -0,24 1,00 -0,03
p-value 0,54 0,00 0,12
Portfolio 4 0,84 0,00 0,84 -0,07
p-value 0,55 0,00 0,59
Portfolio 5 0,78 0,15 0,92 0,07
p-value 0,77 0,00 0,69
W 0,03
p 1,00  
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Table 31: Time-series regression, value portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor and bid-ask spread factor 
Value R2 α β w l
Portfolio 1 0,88 -0,62 1,00 0,02 -0,36
p-value 0,16 0,00 0,87 0,02
Portfolio 2 0,83 -0,34 0,85 0,03 -0,25
p-value 0,46 0,00 0,82 0,12
Portfolio 3 0,89 -0,23 1,04 0,00 0,13
p-value 0,56 0,00 0,98 0,37
Portfolio 4 0,84 0,25 0,87 -0,05 0,10
p-value 0,54 0,00 0,70 0,50
Portfolio 5 0,80 0,20 1,05 0,15 0,43
p-value 0,70 0,00 0,37 0,02
W 0,49
p 0,78  
Table 32: Time-series regression, value portfolios, Fama French three-factor model  
Value R2 α β v s
Portfolio 1 0,92 -0,14 1,09 0,68 0,24
p-value 0,70 0,00 0,00 0,01
Portfolio 2 0,85 -0,10 0,92 0,36 0,20
p-value 0,81 0,00 0,02 0,06
Portfolio 3 0,89 -0,23 1,01 -0,27 -0,11
p-value 0,53 0,00 0,05 0,27
Portfolio 4 0,85 -0,02 0,83 -0,22 -0,17
p-value 0,95 0,00 0,10 0,08
Portfolio 5 0,83 0,03 0,96 -0,67 0,07
p-value 0,94 0,00 0,00 0,54
W 0,04
p 1,00  
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Table 33: Time-series regression, value portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with bid-ask spread factor 
Value R2 α β v s w
Portfolio 1 0,92 -0,18 1,05 0,62 0,25 -0,17
p-value 0,60 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,20
Portfolio 2 0,85 -0,14 0,88 0,30 0,21 -0,17
p-value 0,73 0,00 0,06 0,05 0,28
Portfolio 3 0,89 -0,22 1,02 -0,26 -0,11 0,03
p-value 0,55 0,00 0,08 0,27 0,83
Portfolio 4 0,85 -0,01 0,85 -0,20 -0,18 0,05
p-value 0,98 0,00 0,16 0,08 0,71
Portfolio 5 0,84 0,08 1,01 -0,60 0,06 0,19
p-value 0,85 0,00 0,00 0,58 0,25
W 0,07
p 1,00  
Table 34: Time-series regression, value portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor  
Value R2 α β v s l
Portfolio 1 0,92 -0,27 1,09 0,65 0,20 0,06
p-value 0,47 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,64
Portfolio 2 0,85 -0,07 0,94 0,36 0,22 0,07
p-value 0,87 0,00 0,02 0,06 0,60
Portfolio 3 0,90 -0,44 0,99 -0,31 -0,16 -0,02
p-value 0,25 0,00 0,02 0,10 0,89
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,08 0,82 -0,20 -0,17 -0,07
p-value 0,84 0,00 0,15 0,11 0,58
Portfolio 5 0,84 0,00 1,01 -0,67 0,10 0,14
p-value 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,41 0,34
W 0,27
p 0,93  
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Table 35: Time-series regression, value portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor and bid-ask 
spread factor 
Value R2 α β v s l w
Portfolio 1 0,92 -0,30 1,05 0,59 0,20 0,03 -0,16
p-value 0,42 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,80 0,23
Portfolio 2 0,85 -0,10 0,90 0,31 0,22 0,05 -0,16
p-value 0,81 0,00 0,06 0,05 0,73 0,33
Portfolio 3 0,90 -0,43 1,00 -0,30 -0,16 -0,01 0,03
p-value 0,26 0,00 0,04 0,11 0,92 0,83
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,09 0,83 -0,19 -0,17 -0,07 0,04
p-value 0,83 0,00 0,21 0,12 0,62 0,79
Portfolio 5 0,84 0,04 1,07 -0,59 0,09 0,18 0,22
p-value 0,92 0,00 0,00 0,43 0,24 0,19
W 0,17
p 0,97  
Table 36: Time-series regression bid-ask spread portfolios, CAPM  
Spread R2 α β
Portfolio 1 0,72 -0,19 0,73
p-value 0,64 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,83 -0,27 0,88
p-value 0,45 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,83 0,57 1,01
p-value 0,17 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,89 -0,36 1,24
p-value 0,36 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,87 0,29 1,18
p-value 0,48 0,00
W 0,14
p 0,98  
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Table 37: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, CAPM with bid-ask spread factor 
Spread R2 α β w
Portfolio 1 0,78 -0,18 0,85 0,51
p-value 0,62 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,84 -0,27 0,92 0,17
p-value 0,45 0,00 0,15
Portfolio 3 0,83 0,57 1,02 0,06
p-value 0,17 0,00 0,64
Portfolio 4 0,90 -0,36 1,16 -0,32
p-value 0,33 0,00 0,01
Portfolio 5 0,90 0,28 1,06 -0,51
p-value 0,43 0,00 0,00
W 0,27
p 0,93  
Table 38: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor 
 
Spread R2 α β l
Portfolio 1 0,73 -0,08 0,66 -0,28
p-value 0,84 0,00 0,06
Portfolio 2 0,84 -0,36 0,93 0,23
p-value 0,31 0,00 0,07
Portfolio 3 0,83 0,62 0,97 -0,13
p-value 0,14 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,89 0,00 1,26 0,10
p-value 0,32 0,00 0,49
Portfolio 5 0,87 0,25 1,20 0,10
p-value 0,54 0,00 0,50
W 3,94
p 0,00  
Table 39: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor and bid-ask spread factor 
Spread R2 α β l w
Portfolio 1 0,78 -0,12 0,80 -0,17 0,48
p-value 0,75 0,00 0,21 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,85 -0,38 1,00 0,28 0,23
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,03 0,05
Portfolio 3 0,83 0,62 0,99 -0,12 0,04
p-value 0,14 0,00 0,43 0,78
Portfolio 4 0,90 -0,37 1,17 0,02 -0,31
p-value 0,33 0,00 0,87 0,02
Portfolio 5 0,90 0,29 1,05 -0,02 -0,52
p-value 0,42 0,00 0,85 0,00
W 0,05
p 1,00  
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Table 40: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, Fama French three-factor model  
Spread R2 α β v s
Portfolio 1 0,79 -0,03 0,80 0,14 0,46
p-value 0,93 0,00 0,30 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,87 -0,17 0,95 -0,01 0,36
p-value 0,60 0,00 0,95 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,85 0,48 1,04 -0,42 -0,03
p-value 0,23 0,00 0,01 0,81
Portfolio 4 0,91 -0,39 1,16 0,27 -0,31
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,06 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,93 0,13 1,07 0,03 -0,57
p-value 0,68 0,00 0,83 0,00
W 0,07
p 1,00  
 
 
Table 41: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with bid-ask spread factor 
Spread R2 α β v s w
Portfolio 1 0,86 0,00 0,91 0,30 0,42 0,53
p-value 1,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,87 -0,16 0,97 0,03 0,35 0,14
p-value 0,62 0,00 0,78 0,00 0,21
Portfolio 3 0,84 0,48 1,03 -0,43 -0,02 -0,03
p-value 0,23 0,00 0,01 0,83 0,83
Portfolio 4 0,92 -0,40 1,11 0,19 -0,29 -0,24
p-value 0,24 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,05
Portfolio 5 0,95 0,10 0,97 -0,12 -0,53 -0,48
p-value 0,68 0,00 0,24 0,00 0,00
W 0,00
p 1,00  
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Table 42: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor  
Spread R2 α β v s l
Portfolio 1 0,80 0,07 0,74 0,16 0,45 -0,24
p-value 0,85 0,00 0,23 0,00 0,06
Portfolio 2 0,88 -0,27 1,02 -0,03 0,38 0,27
p-value 0,38 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,02
Portfolio 3 0,84 0,52 1,01 -0,41 -0,03 -0,11
p-value 0,20 0,00 0,01 0,76 0,46
Portfolio 4 0,91 -0,41 1,17 0,26 -0,31 0,05
p-value 0,26 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,72
Portfolio 5 0,93 0,12 1,08 0,02 -0,57 0,04
p-value 0,72 0,00 0,85 0,00 0,75
W 0,13
p 0,99  
 
 
Table 43: Time-series regression, bid-ask spread portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor and bid-
ask spread factor 
Spread R2 α β v s l w
Portfolio 1 0,86 0,05 0,86 0,31 0,41 -0,14 0,50
p-value 0,86 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,20 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,88 -0,28 1,07 0,03 0,36 0,31 0,20
p-value 0,36 0,00 0,81 0,00 0,01 0,06
Portfolio 3 0,84 0,52 1,00 -0,43 -0,03 -0,12 -0,05
p-value 0,20 0,00 0,01 0,79 0,43 0,71
Portfolio 4 0,91 -0,40 1,11 0,19 -0,29 0,00 -0,24
p-value 0,25 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,97 0,06
Portfolio 5 0,95 0,13 0,95 -0,12 -0,54 -0,07 -0,49
p-value 0,62 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,48 0,00
W 0,36
p 0,88  
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Table 44: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, CAPM  
Turnover R2 α β
Portfolio 1 0,75 -0,35 0,68
p-value 0,33 0,00
Portfolio 2 0,85 0,08 0,77
p-value 0,79 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,84 -0,32 0,99
p-value 0,41 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,83 0,62 1,22
p-value 0,21 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,87 -0,08 1,28
p-value 0,86 0,00
W 0,52
p 0,76  
 
Table 45: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, CAPM with bid-ask spread factor 
Turnover R2 α β w
Portfolio 1 0,75 -0,35 0,72 0,15
p-value 0,33 0,00 0,20
Portfolio 2 0,85 0,08 0,80 0,10
p-value 0,79 0,00 0,33
Portfolio 3 0,86 -0,31 1,08 0,37
p-value 0,39 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,83 0,62 1,21 -0,05
p-value 0,22 0,00 0,76
Portfolio 5 0,90 -0,09 1,15 -0,54
p-value 0,82 0,00 0,00
W 1,40
p 0,24  
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Table 46: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, CAPM with turnover  
Turnover R2 α β l
Portfolio 1 0,76 -0,45 0,74 0,25
p-value 0,20 0,00 0,05
Portfolio 2 0,87 -0,05 0,85 0,32
p-value 0,86 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,85 -0,40 1,04 0,21
p-value 0,30 0,00 0,97
Portfolio 4 0,86 0,00 1,09 -0,55
p-value 0,07 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,87 0,00 1,23 -0,20
p-value 1,00 0,00 0,22
W 2,89
p 0,02  
Table 47: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, CAPM with turnover factor and bid-ask spread factor 
Turnover R2 α β l w
Portfolio 1 0,77 -0,47 0,81 0,30 0,22
p-value 0,18 0,00 0,02 0,07
Portfolio 2 0,88 -0,06 0,90 0,36 0,17
p-value 0,82 0,00 0,00 0,07
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,44 1,17 0,31 0,43
p-value 0,22 0,00 0,02 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,86 0,85 1,04 -0,59 -0,17
p-value 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,28
Portfolio 5 0,91 0,04 1,05 -0,34 -0,61
p-value 0,91 0,00 0,02 0,00
W 0,49
p 0,78  
 
Table 48: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, Fama French three-factor model  
Turnover R2 α β v s
Portfolio 1 0,74 -0,30 0,68 0,13 0,07
p-value 0,40 0,00 0,35 0,50
Portfolio 2 0,85 0,08 0,79 -0,07 0,06
p-value 0,79 0,00 0,53 0,48
Portfolio 3 0,87 -0,24 1,07 -0,12 0,36
p-value 0,49 0,00 0,38 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,83 0,59 1,22 -0,08 -0,03
p-value 0,24 0,00 0,67 0,82
Portfolio 5 0,90 -0,17 1,18 0,16 -0,44
p-value 0,67 0,00 0,29 0,00
W 0,32
p 0,90  
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Table 49: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with bid-ask spread factor 
Turnover R2 α β v s w
Portfolio 1 0,75 -0,29 0,72 0,19 0,05 0,19
p-value 0,41 0,00 0,19 0,60 0,13
Portfolio 2 0,85 0,08 0,81 -0,05 0,05 0,08
p-value 0,78 0,00 0,69 0,53 0,45
Portfolio 3 0,88 -0,23 1,14 -0,02 0,33 0,32
p-value 0,50 0,00 0,86 0,00 0,01
Portfolio 4 0,82 0,59 1,21 -0,10 -0,03 -0,07
p-value 0,25 0,00 0,61 0,85 0,69
Portfolio 5 0,92 -0,20 1,08 0,01 -0,40 -0,49
p-value 0,58 0,00 0,92 0,00 0,00
W 0,56
p 0,73  
Table 50: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor  
Turnover R2 α β v s l
Portfolio 1 0,76 -0,40 0,75 0,11 0,09 0,25
p-value 0,26 0,00 0,41 0,39 0,05
Portfolio 2 0,87 -0,05 0,88 -0,10 0,08 0,33
p-value 0,85 0,00 0,36 0,29 0,00
Portfolio 3 0,88 -0,35 1,14 -0,14 0,37 0,26
p-value 0,32 0,00 0,29 0,00 0,04
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,81 1,08 -0,04 -0,07 -0,55
p-value 0,09 0,00 0,82 0,61 0,00
Portfolio 5 0,90 -0,07 1,11 0,18 -0,46 -0,26
p-value 0,85 0,00 0,23 0,00 0,07
W 8,18
p 0,00  
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Table 51: Time-series regression, turnover portfolios, Fama French three-factor model with turnover factor and bid-ask 
spread factor 
Turnover R2 α β v s l w
Portfolio 1 0,77 -0,41 0,81 0,18 0,07 0,31 0,25
p-value 0,24 0,00 0,18 0,48 0,02 0,04
Portfolio 2 0,88 -0,06 0,92 -0,05 0,07 0,36 0,15
p-value 0,84 0,00 0,62 0,36 0,00 0,12
Portfolio 3 0,90 -0,36 1,24 -0,03 0,35 0,34 0,39
p-value 0,27 0,00 0,82 0,00 0,00 0,00
Portfolio 4 0,85 0,81 1,03 -0,09 -0,05 -0,59 -0,19
p-value 0,09 0,00 0,61 0,68 0,00 0,26
Portfolio 5 0,93 -0,06 0,97 0,02 -0,42 -0,38 -0,57
p-value 0,86 0,00 0,88 0,00 0,00 0,00
W 1,10
p 0,37  
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